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ABSTRACT 
  Over the past two decades, courts and commentators have often 
treated the class action as though it were a monolith, limiting their 
analysis to the particular class form that joins together a large number 
of claims for monetary relief. This Article argues that the myopic 
focus on the aggregated-damages class action has led to under-
theorization of the other class-action subtypes, which serve far 
different purposes and have far different effects, and has allowed the 
ongoing backlash against the aggregated-damages class action to 
affect the other subtypes in an undifferentiated manner. The failure to 
confine this backlash to its intended target has had a negative impact 
on the availability of the other class forms, harming the interests of 
both litigants and the judiciary. In particular, in civil-rights cases 
involving injunctive or declaratory relief, obstacles to class treatment 
pose a threat to remedial efficacy and the rule of law. Courts, 
lawmakers, and scholars should therefore engage in a broader 
analysis that takes into account all of the subtypes set forth in the 
modern class-action rule. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It has become a commonplace to say that the class action is 
dying, or at least, that courts and lawmakers are trying to kill it.1 This 
 
 1. See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the 
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 375 (2005) (“[I]t is likely that, with a handful of 
exceptions, class actions will soon be virtually extinct.”); Linda S. Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation 
and the Death of Democratic Dispute Resolution, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 511, 516 (2013) (“Various 
Cassandras over the past four decades have frequently, inaccurately, and repetitively reported 
the class action’s death. . . . Class action litigation, it turns out, is hard to kill off.”); Jay 
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Article argues that something different is going on: courts and 
lawmakers are trying to rein in a specific type of class action, and in 
the process, they are imposing unwarranted constraints on all of the 
others. 
The problem is one of square pegs and round holes, and it arises 
from a myopic focus on the aggregated-damages class action,2 the 
particular class form that aggregates a large number of monetary 
claims into a single class-wide recovery. Myopia is not blindness, and 
this problem has not arisen from a lack of knowledge on the part of 
courts, lawmakers, or scholars. Those who deal with class actions in 
their professional lives are aware that subtypes other than the 
aggregated-damages class action exist, and when they explicitly 
discuss those other class forms, they also recognize significant 
differences among them. However, when they turn their attention to 
perceived problems with the class-action device—and the appropriate 
responses to those problems—their knowledge and recognition of the 
other class forms tends to fall by the wayside. At that point, they tend 
to focus almost entirely on the aggregated-damages class action. 
In an aggregated-damages class action, the amount of the 
recovery increases in connection with the number of people in the 
class, a feature that is both a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, 
the scaling-up from individual to class-wide recoveries can create 
economic viability where none existed before, by increasing the 
potential contingency fee enough that the litigation becomes worth an 
attorney’s time.3 On the other hand, the incentive to create ever-
larger classes can lead to unwieldy litigation, eyebrow-raising fees, 
and confiscatory recoveries.4 
 
Tidmarsh, Living in CAFA’s World, 32 REV. LITIG. 691, 691 (2013) (“It is fashionable these 
days to talk about the death of class actions.”). 
 2. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 3. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“The policy at the very 
core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not 
provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A 
class action solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into 
something worth someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.” (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit 
Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997))). It bears emphasis that the creation of economic 
viability occurs only in negative-value class actions, that is, those in which the costs of individual 
litigation exceed the potential for recovery. Some aggregated-damages class actions, however, 
involve individual claims large enough to bring on their own. For those claims, rather than 
serving a litigation-facilitating purpose, the aggregated-damages class action can promote values 
of efficiency and uniformity. See infra Part I.B. 
 4. For discussion of the negative impacts of suboptimal class sizes, see generally David 
Betson & Jay Tidmarsh, Optimal Class Size, Opt-Out Rights, and “Indivisible” Remedies, 79 
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Over the past two decades, courts and commentators have been 
arguing about the settlement pressure arising from class certification, 
the massive fee awards received by class counsel, and the time and 
expense required for class-action litigation, among other issues.5 
Disagreements tend to center on the extent to which the benefits of 
class treatment justify these deviations from the asserted norms of 
traditional bilateral litigation,6 rather than the question whether class 
treatment in fact entails those deviations.7 This debate has led to a 
series of restrictions on class treatment, as courts and lawmakers have 
aimed for a better balance between the costs and benefits of allowing 
the class action to achieve its litigation-facilitating purpose.8 
The class action, however, does not have a purpose; it has 
purposes.9 The current debate largely fails to reflect the versatility of 
the class action’s design. Consider the following examples: 
 Logically indivisible relief: Residents of New York City allege 
that the city’s emergency-preparedness program fails to accommodate 
the needs of persons with disabilities by, for example, failing to 
adequately provide for the evacuation of persons with disabilities 
from multistory buildings.10 The residents sue for an injunction to 
change the program. 
 Limited funds: Hurricanes cause the levees in New Orleans to 
break, leading to extensive flooding. Residents suffer hundreds of 
millions of dollars in damages, but only about $21 million in insurance 
funds is available to satisfy their claims.11 The residents sue to recover 
their fair share of the funds. 
 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 542 (2011); Jay Tidmarsh, Cy Pres and the Optimal Class Action, 82 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 767 (2014). 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. For a discussion of the asserted norms of traditional bilateral litigation, see generally 
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976). 
 7. Cf. Richard A. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1105, 1108 (2010) (criticizing the debate over class actions for “tend[ing] to convey the 
impression that the world neatly divides itself into the mass effects unique to class actions and 
the confined realm of litigation between individuals, each standing alone and each separately 
represented”). 
 8. See infra Part III; see generally Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 
WASH. U. L. REV. 729 (2013) (arguing that by weakening plaintiffs’ ability to bring class-action 
lawsuits, courts are undermining the efficiency, deterrence, and compensatory functions of the 
class action). 
 9. See infra Part I. 
 10. See Brooklyn Ctr. for Indep. of the Disabled v. Bloomberg, 980 F. Supp. 2d 588, 595–96 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).  
 11. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 628 F.3d 185, 189–90 (5th Cir. 2010). 
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 Civil rights: A mental health provider alleges that a California 
law banning “sexual orientation change efforts” for minors (that is, 
therapy designed to convert minors from homosexual to 
heterosexual) violates his First Amendment rights. The provider sues 
for an injunction prohibiting the statute’s enforcement, not only as to 
him, but as to all others who provide such therapy.12 
 Aggregated damages: Consumers in Ohio allege that a company 
has sold them defective washing machines, which damage their 
clothing and create unpleasant odors in their homes.13 The consumers 
sue to recover the damages allegedly caused by the machines. 
Plaintiffs may bring a class action in each of the foregoing 
scenarios, but each situation entails a different justification for class 
treatment and a different set of procedural needs. The class-action 
rule thus contains a different provision, with different procedural 
requirements, applicable to each:14 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(b)(1)(A) for logically indivisible relief,15 Rule 23(b)(1)(B) for the 
distribution of a limited fund,16 Rule 23(b)(2) for civil rights and 
common conduct,17 and Rule 23(b)(3) for aggregated damages.18 For 
 
 12. See Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1221–22 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 13. See In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838, 844 
(6th Cir. 2013). 
 14. In order to obtain certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a 
plaintiff must demonstrate that the proposed class meets each of the four prerequisites 
described in Rule 23(a), which consist of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of 
representation. Many courts also impose the implicit requirements that a definable class must 
exist, and that the plaintiff must be a member of the class. 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, 
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:1 (5th ed. 2011); see also infra Part III.C (discussing the 
“ascertainability” requirement for class certification). The plaintiff must also show that the 
proposed class falls under at least one of the four subtypes described in Rule 23(b), which are 
set forth in the text. Confusingly, Rules 23(a) and (b) differ in their numbering; although the 
four prerequisites are set forth in (a)(1), (2), (3), and (4), the four subtypes are set forth in 
(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), (b)(2), and (b)(3). FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 15. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A) (“A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is 
satisfied and if . . . prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would 
create a risk of . . . inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class 
members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the 
class . . . .”). 
 16. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B) (“A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is 
satisfied and if . . . prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would 
create a risk of . . . adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical 
matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual 
adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their 
interests . . . .”). 
 17. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) (“A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied 
and if . . . the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply 
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simplicity, I will refer to these subtypes as the logical-indivisibility, 
limited-fund, injunctive civil-rights, and aggregated-damages class 
actions, respectively.19 In contrast to the efficiency and litigation-
facilitating purposes of the aggregated-damages class action,20 the 
logical-indivisibility subtype protects against inconsistent judgments, 
the limited-fund subtype promotes the fair distribution of insufficient 
resources, and the injunctive civil-rights subtype facilitates class-wide 
relief for class-wide harms.21 
These subtypes came into being nearly a half century ago, 
through revisions to Rule 23 that took effect in 1966.22 By then, 
centuries of Anglo American case law had demonstrated a need for 
devices like the logical-indivisibility and limited-fund subtypes as a 
means of protecting judicial legitimacy and preventing unfairness to 
litigants.23 Similarly, relatively recent experiences with desegregation 
claims had demonstrated a need for a device like the injunctive civil-
rights subtype as a means of promoting the rule of law and securing 
effective relief for large-scale harms.24 In contrast, the aggregated-
damages class action reached beyond previous judicial experience to 
encompass situations in which class treatment was “not as clearly 
called for,” as the authors of the revisions put it.25 Although the other 
 
generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is 
appropriate respecting the class as a whole . . . .”). 
 18. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (“A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied 
and if . . . the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is 
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”). 
 19. Note that, although I use these labels as shorthand, they do not capture the full range 
of claims that each subtype can encompass. For example, although courts and scholars 
sometimes refer to Rule 23(b)(2) as the civil-rights class action, its application is not limited to 
any particular area of substantive law. In addition, in rare circumstances, courts have certified 
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) classes in cases that do not involve the distribution of a limited fund. See 5 
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.42[3][c] (3d ed. 1997); see also, 
e.g., Oneida Indian Nation of Wis. v. New York, 85 F.R.D. 701 (N.D.N.Y. 1980) (certifying a 
class under 23(b)(1)(B) to adjudicate aboriginal rights). For a more detailed explanation of the 
scope and origin of each subtype, see infra Parts I.A–B.  
 20. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text; see also infra Part I.B. 
 21. See infra Part I.A. 
 22. See infra Part I; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 
amendment.  
 23. See infra Parts I.A.1–2. 
 24. See infra Part I.A.3; see generally David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation 
Litigation and its Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657 (2011) 
[hereinafter Marcus, Flawed but Noble] (arguing that prior desegregation actions played a role 
in the drafting of the 1966 Rule 23 amendments). 
 25. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.  
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subtypes were designed to capture the lessons of existing case law, the 
aggregated-damages class action was an innovation, designed for 
procedural flexibility and adaptation.26 
And adaptation did indeed occur. Incentivized by the promise of 
sizable contingency fees, which were largely unavailable under the 
other subtypes, plaintiffs’ lawyers turned their creative energies to the 
aggregated-damages class action. They achieved great success, and by 
the mid-1990s, courts certified more class actions under the 
aggregated-damages subtype than any other.27 Yet even as the use of 
the aggregated-damages class action has expanded, the need for the 
other subtypes has remained—research suggests that about one third 
of class actions involve subtypes other than the aggregated-damages 
class action, with the injunctive civil-rights class action accounting for 
a large majority of that subset.28 Moreover, due to the substantive 
claims involved, those subtypes have an importance beyond their raw 
numbers. The injunctive civil-rights class action, in particular, plays an 
important role in the articulation and enforcement of constitutional 
rights.29 The mandate of Brown v. Board of Education,30 for example, 
 
 26. See infra Part I.B. 
 27. As late as the mid-1980s, the injunctive civil-rights subtype accounted for most of the 
class actions that achieved certification. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP 
LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 246 (1987). A few years later, however, a large-
scale study of federal class-action activity demonstrated that “the world of class actions in 1995–
96 was primarily a world of Rule 23(b)(3) damages class actions.” DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET 
AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS 
FOR PRIVATE GAIN 52 (2000); see also Thomas E. Willging, Laural L. Hooper & Robert J. 
Niemic, An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 74, 94 (1996) (affirming this finding in a smaller-scale study). But see Judith Resnik, 
Comment, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and 
Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 147 (2011) (noting that only limited data are available 
about class-action litigation).  
 28. Willging et al., supra note 27, at 94; see also infra note 193 (noting that, among the 
limited subset of interlocutory appeals from class certification decisions between November 30, 
1998 and May 31, 2012, about 29 percent involved the injunctive civil-rights subtype). On the 
one hand, if class treatment were more readily available, this proportion might well be higher. 
See infra Part IV.C; see also Maureen Carroll, Aggregation for Me, But Not for Thee: The Rise of 
Common Claims in Non-Class Litigation, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 2017, 2024–37 (2015) (analyzing 
plaintiffs’ structural incentives and disincentives to pursuing class treatment when challenging a 
defendant’s generally applicable policy or practice). On the other hand, these studies took place 
before the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes limited the types of 
claims that could be pursued in an injunctive civil-rights class action, see infra note 138 and 
accompanying text, which suggests that the proportion of such class actions might now be lower. 
 29. Carroll, supra note 28, at 2068–69; see also Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation and 
Constitutional Rights, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 598 (2012) (arguing that class actions offer 
important institutional advantages for the development of constitutional rights). 
 30. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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would have been more difficult to carry out if African American 
students had to sue one by one to obtain admission to previously 
segregated schools.31 
Not only does the current debate largely fail to reflect the 
function and importance of subtypes other than the aggregated-
damages class action,32 but more important, it also has produced 
across-the-board changes in class-action law that have made the 
purposes of the other subtypes more difficult to achieve.33 Limitations 
ranging from broadened appellate review of class-certification 
decisions34 to heightened commonality under Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes35 have rendered the device inefficient or unavailable for some 
of its least controversial uses, as a result of perceived problems that 
may have little or nothing to do with those uses.36 Indeed, it is unclear 
whether the paradigmatic post-Brown desegregation cases could be 
certified as class actions under today’s restrictive standards.37 
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the impact of these 
undifferentiated restrictions on civil-rights litigation deserves 
particular concern.38 Effective enforcement of civil-rights laws 
 
 31. By noting that it would have been more difficult without the class-action device, I do 
not mean to imply that it was easy. Nor do I mean to imply that the work is done. See generally 
GARY ORFIELD & ERICA FRANKENBERG, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, BROWN AT 60: GREAT 
PROGRESS, A LONG RETREAT, AND AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE (May 15, 2014) (reviewing the 
impact of desegregation efforts over the past sixty years). 
 32. See infra Part II. 
 33. See infra Part III. “Myopia” implies inadvertence, and indeed, the initial creation of 
these across-the-board changes has generally resulted from courts’ and scholars’ inattention, 
rather than hostility, to the other subtypes. That initial inattention, however, creates room for 
subsequent opportunism. For example, a court that doubts the legitimacy or goals of an 
injunctive civil-rights case can rely on the broadly-stated holdings of prior aggregated-damages 
cases to deny class treatment. See infra notes 290–96 and accompanying text. 
 34. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (“A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting 
or denying class-action certification under this rule if a petition for permission to appeal is filed 
with the circuit clerk within 14 days after the order is entered.”); see also infra Part III.A. 
 35. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011); see also infra Part III.E. 
 36. Cf. Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions As We Know Them: Rethinking the 
American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 439–40 (2014) (arguing that “[t]he ascendancy of 
the damage class action has been accompanied by the panoply of problems that bring class 
litigation into disrepute,” and that “[m]any of the class action harms that have developed 
recently would be avoided with elimination of the damage class action from the rule”). 
 37. See infra notes 285–89 and accompanying text. 
 38. See Suzette Malveaux, A Diamond in the Rough: Trans-Substantivity of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and Its Detrimental Impact on Civil Rights, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 455, 
484–508 (2014) (noting that “the class action device . . . plays a special role in the civil rights 
context” and explaining how civil-rights claimants “have been hit particularly hard by 
increasingly restrictive applications and interpretations of Rule 23”). Cf. David Marcus, The 
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depends on private litigation, as Congress recognized long ago.39 But 
when only declaratory or injunctive relief is at issue, the private sector 
generally lacks an economic incentive to bring such litigation,40 let 
alone to do so on a class basis.41 Market forces thus suppress the 
litigation of class actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief for 
civil-rights violations. Increases in the transaction costs associated 
with injunctive civil-rights class actions can only further suppress this 
type of class litigation.42 
Recent cases brought under the injunctive civil-rights subtype 
illustrate the harms that undifferentiated restrictions on class 
treatment can cause.43 In some such cases, the denial of class 
certification can prevent the courts from reaching the merits of 
important issues.44 In others, it can increase the time and expense 
involved in litigating those issues on a class basis, without a 
corresponding benefit to the fairness or accuracy of the results.45 
Increases in the time and expense required for class litigation, in turn, 
will lead some litigants to forego seeking class treatment in the first 
instance; that choice can have negative consequences for judicial 
economy, rights articulation, and other values that the judicial system 
should promote.46 In order to prevent these harms and improve the 
conceptual coherence of class-action law, courts, lawmakers, and 
scholars should move beyond the prevailing myopia to undertake a 
 
Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 4) (on file with the 
Duke Law Journal) [hereinafter, Marcus, Public Interest] (“Significant public interest cases have 
recently run aground for failure to meet Rule 23’s requirements, in ways that would have been 
nearly unimaginable a decade ago.”).  
 39. See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 401–02 (1968) (describing the 
congressional intent underlying fee-shifting statutes).  
 40. Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private Enforcement, 17 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 678 (2013). 
 41. Carroll, supra note 28, at 2073–74 (explaining that class-action status does not itself 
increase the fee available under fee-shifting statutes). 
 42. Cf. Francis E. McGovern, The Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions in Mass Torts, 39 
ARIZ. L. REV. 595, 605–06 (1997) (discussing the effect of rising transaction costs on the 
litigation rate of widely held claims). It bears noting that suppressing the class litigation of a 
particular type of claim, such as civil rights, is often not the same as suppressing that type of 
litigation overall. As explained infra Part IV.C, increases in the transaction costs associated with 
class treatment will lead some plaintiffs to bring their claims on an individual rather than a class 
basis, causing inefficiencies and other difficult institutional problems. 
 43. See infra Part IV. 
 44. See infra Part IV.A. 
 45. See infra Part IV.B. 
 46. See infra Part IV.C. 
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broader analysis, one that takes into account all of the subtypes set 
forth in the modern class-action rule.47 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I analyzes the origin and 
structure of the modern class-action rule to demonstrate its 
multifunctional design. Part II demonstrates the ways in which the 
current class-action debate neglects the existence and function of 
subtypes other than the aggregated-damages class action. Part III 
examines the mismatch between this conceptually limited debate and 
the across-the-board changes that it has produced. Part IV presents 
case studies of the harms that the undifferentiated changes can cause, 
and Part V identifies a set of approaches to mitigating and reversing 
those harms. 
I.  THE NEGLECTED STRUCTURE OF THE CLASS-ACTION RULE 
The class-action rule took on its current structure through 
amendments that went into effect in 1966.48 By that time, American 
courts had decades of experience with the prior version of Rule 23 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in addition to a much larger 
body of Anglo American case law on aggregate litigation generally.49 
The authors of the 1966 amendments took the lessons of history into 
account,50 but they did not allow that history to constrain them. They 
created a new framework requiring that all class actions must satisfy 
the prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and 
adequacy of representation,51 and must also fit within one of four 
 
 47. See infra Part V. When referring to the “modern” class-action rule, I mean the 
structure adopted in 1966, which introduced the subtypes set forth in Rule 23(b). FED. R. CIV. P. 
23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment; see also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 
815, 833 (1999) (explaining that “modern class action practice emerged in the 1966 revision of 
Rule 23”). 
 48. David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm und Drang, 1953–
1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 588 (2013) [hereinafter Marcus, History]; see also FED. R. CIV. 
P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (replacing the original rule, which had 
defined the categories of class actions “in terms of the abstract nature of the rights involved”). 
 49. See YEAZELL, supra note 27, at 238–50.  
 50. For example, because scholars had criticized the prior version of the rule for allowing 
class members to opt into litigation after it became clear that the class would be successful, the 
1966 authors determined that every certified class action would result in a judgment declaring 
all members of the class to be bound. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3) advisory committee’s note to 1966 
amendment; Sherman L. Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1204, 
1225 (1966) (“The new rule eliminates the unfairness of what the Advisory Committee terms 
one-way intervention by a spurious class member, who, under the old rule, could remain 
uncommitted until the termination of the litigation.”). 
 51. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
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class-action subtypes.52 As described below, three of the subtypes 
represented an effort to codify a set of best practices that courts had 
already developed, whereas the fourth marked an ambitious and 
uncertain change in American civil procedure. It is that final category 
that, over the past two decades, has driven the path of the class-action 
rule as a whole. 
A. Three Categories Rooted in Judicial Experience 
Advisory Committee reporter Benjamin Kaplan, writing in the 
year following the adoption of revised Rule 23, described the drafters’ 
approach to prior judicial experience with class actions as follows: 
The Advisory Committee . . . perceived, as lawyers had for a long 
time, that some litigious situations affecting numerous persons 
“naturally” or “necessarily” called for unitary adjudication. . . . 
Approaching rule 23, then . . . the Committee strove to sort out the 
factual situations or patterns that had recurred in class actions and 
appeared with varying degrees of convincingness to justify treatment 
of the class in solido. The revised rule was written upon the 
framework thus revealed . . . .53 
This analysis of recurring fact patterns resulted in the first three 
categories described in the class-action rule: the logical-indivisibility 
subtype set forth in Rule 23(b)(1)(A), the limited-fund subtype set 
forth in Rule 23(b)(1)(B), and the injunctive civil-rights subtype set 
forth in Rule 23(b)(2).54 These three subtypes are collectively known 
as the “mandatory” class actions, because if a court certifies a class 
action under one of these subtypes, class members do not have an 
absolute right to decline membership in the class—that is, to “opt 
out.”55 (In contrast, the aggregated-damages class action set forth in 
 
 52. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
 53. Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 386 (1967). Kaplan had a strong 
leadership role in the drafting of the revisions to Rule 23. John P. Frank, Response to 1996 
Circulation of Proposed Rule 23 on Class Actions, in 2 WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULE 23, at 262, 265 
(1997), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/workingpapers-vol2pdf [http://perma.cc/9SJW-KMXK]. 
 54. For an explanation of these labels, see supra note 19. 
 55. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 412 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he drafters of 
Rule 23 found it unnecessary to provide (b)(1) and (b)(2) class members with the absolute right 
to notice or to opt-out of the class . . . .”). But see 5 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON 
CLASS ACTIONS § 16:17 (4th ed. 2002) (“[C]ourts have the discretionary power to allow 
exclusion in Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions” but “generally courts have declined to 
extend the exclusion rule to include these classes.”). 
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Rule 23(b)(3) does provide an absolute right to opt out.56) Due to 
their historical pedigrees, and because of the confusion that the term 
“mandatory” can cause,57 I will refer to these three subtypes as the 
“traditional” class actions. 
1. Inconsistent Judgments and Rule 23(b)(1)(A).  The Advisory 
Committee began its search for the traditional class-action categories 
by asking what would happen, in different factual scenarios, if more 
than one potential claimant brought an individual lawsuit.58 In one 
scenario that courts had repeatedly faced, individual actions by 
multiple claimants created a risk of inconsistent judgments. The 
problem arose when a defendant had to choose whether to take a 
single, impersonal action with the potential to affect numerous other 
people—for example, taking water from a stream,59 constructing a 
building,60 or issuing a bond.61 The defendant’s conduct in such cases is 
logically indivisible in the sense that it cannot possibly be modified as 
to one plaintiff but not another.62 For example, a defendant cannot 
take water from a particular stream so as to reduce the amount of 
water available to one downstream landowner, yet leave the amount 
of water available to another downstream landowner unchanged. 
Similarly, a defendant cannot both construct and not construct a 
particular building, or issue and not issue a particular bond. 
Although the defendant in a case involving logical indivisibility 
has no ability to take different actions toward different plaintiffs, 
 
 56. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (creating an opt-out provision only for classes certified under 
the aggregated-damages subtype). For this reason, courts and scholars sometimes refer to this 
subtype as the “opt-out” class action. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 
615 (1997) (“Rule 23(b)(3) ‘opt-out’ class actions superseded the former ‘spurious’ class 
action . . . .”). 
 57. Some who hear the term “mandatory” take it to mean that, if a case falls into one of 
these three categories, then the plaintiff has no choice but to bring it as a class action. As 
explained infra Part IV.C, however, such a plaintiff does have a choice in the matter, and the 
potential for a plaintiff to make an institutionally suboptimal choice should factor into the 
development of class-action law. 
 58. Kaplan, supra note 53, at 387–88. 
 59. See Fleming v. Bennett, 116 P.2d 442, 444 (Cal. 1941); Kaplan, supra note 53, at 388. 
 60. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment; Gart v. 
Cole, 263 F.2d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 1959). 
 61. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment; 
Maricopa Cty. Mun. Water Conservation Dist. No. One v. Looney, 219 F.2d 529, 530 (9th Cir. 
1955).  
 62. In some cases, the indivisibility results from legal rather than logical constraints, as 
when a utility is required by law to treat all customers alike. Kaplan, supra note 53, at 388. 
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multiple claimants might individually possess the right to sue the 
defendant over its conduct. In the absence of class treatment, this 
potential for multiple lawsuits would present an adjudicatory problem 
for both courts and litigants. A court might issue a decree requiring 
the defendant to take an action different from that required by 
another court’s decree. Defendants might thereby find themselves 
subject to conflicting orders, or orders that simultaneously permitted 
and prohibited the challenged conduct. It was this risk of inconsistent 
judgments, and its negative consequences for judicial legitimacy, that 
the authors of the 1966 revisions sought to avoid. 
To address cases involving logically indivisible relief, the authors 
of the 1966 revisions created Rule 23(b)(1)(A). The text of this 
subtype explicitly sets forth its purpose of preventing inconsistent 
judgments, providing for class treatment when “prosecuting separate 
actions by or against individual class members would create a risk 
of . . . inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual 
class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct 
for the party opposing the class.”63 The Advisory Committee 
envisioned that the logical-indivisibility subtype would enable a 
single, class-wide adjudication of the claimants’ rights and the 
defendant’s duties, preserving judicial legitimacy and assuring the 
possibility of compliance.64 
2. Depleted Resources and Rule 23(b)(1)(B).  In creating the 
logical-indivisibility subtype, the authors of the 1966 revisions 
generally took a defendant’s perspective on the risks of individual 
adjudications. In contrast, when they turned to the limited-fund 
subtype, they took up the perspective of potential claimants.65 Here, 
the risk to be avoided was that the adjudication of one claimant’s 
rights would prejudice the interests of the others—for example, by 
depleting the resources available to satisfy future judgments.66 Rule 
19, which governs joinder of required parties,67 addresses the same 
 
 63. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A). 
 64. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment. 
 65. Kaplan, supra note 53, at 388–89. 
 66. Id. at 389. As noted, on rare occasions this subtype has been used when circumstances 
other than the limited-fund scenario create this potential for intra-group prejudice. See supra 
note 19. 
 67. Specifically, Rule 19(a)(1) states,  
A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the 
court of subject-matter jurisdiction must be joined as a party if: (A) in that person’s 
absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties; or (B) that 
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risk on a smaller scale;68 not coincidentally, amendments to that rule 
took effect simultaneously with the revisions to Rule 23.69 
At the time of the 1966 revisions, principles similar to those 
captured in Rule 19 had already existed for centuries.70 Courts had 
developed those principles to address recurring fact patterns, 
including the limited-fund scenario, in which the externalities of an 
individual case had the potential to harm similarly situated plaintiffs.71 
Just as the logical-indivisibility scenario involved the impossibility of 
a defendant complying with incompatible standards of conduct, the 
limited-fund scenario involved another problem of impossibility, one 
that arose when a defendant would not be able to pay out all of the 
judgments that could be entered against it.72 
Early limited-fund cases involved situations such as foreclosure 
on a property subject to multiple mortgages and the distribution of a 
decedent’s assets to his creditors.73 Those types of cases continued 
into the modern era even as new forms, such as lawsuits seeking to 
 
person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that 
disposing of the action in the person’s absence may: (i) as a practical matter impair or 
impede the person’s ability to protect the interest; or (ii) leave an existing party 
subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent 
obligations because of the interest.  
FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1). Previous versions of the rule used different terminology, referring to 
“necessary” and “indispensable” parties rather than “required” parties. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b) 
(“When persons who are not indispensable . . . have not been made parties . . . the court shall 
order them summoned . . . .”).  
 68. FED. R. CIV. P. 19. Because required-party rules also address the risk of inconsistent 
adjudications, they can be seen as precursors to both Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and (B). See Geoffrey C. 
Hazard, Jr., Indispensable Party: The Historical Origin of a Procedural Phantom, 61 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1254, 1257–58 (1961) (discussing cases concerned with “avoidance of inconsistent 
results”). 
 69. See Kaplan, supra note 53, at 389 (noting the relationship between amended Rule 19 
and the criteria set forth in Rule 23(b)(1)); see also id. at 358–59 (demonstrating reliance on 
Geoffrey Hazard’s work in amending Rule 19). 
 70. See generally Hazard, supra note 68, at 1257–58 (discussing seventeenth-century 
decisions about necessary-party joinder, which courts justified for reasons including “avoidance 
of a multiplicity of actions, assurance of adequate presentation of the issues and relevant 
evidence, efficient use of judicial effort, and avoidance of inconsistent adjudication between 
different parties to the transaction”).  
 71. See William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation?: A Positive Externalities Theory of 
the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709, 722–23 (2006) (“[E]ach of the various 
types of class cases can be understood as necessitated by the externalities of individual 
litigation. . . . In a limited fund class case, for example, individual lawsuits produce spillover 
effects on persons not parties: by depleting the defendant’s available resources, the early 
individual cases harm later litigants.”).  
 72. Kaplan, supra note 53, at 361. 
 73. See Hazard, supra note 68, at 1256–70 (discussing seventeenth- through nineteenth-
century cases). 
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divide insurance proceeds among those injured in an accident or 
natural disaster, came into being.74 The thread tying the cases together 
was the risk that the latest-in-time claimants might be left with no 
recourse, despite having valid claims against the defendant, because 
of the practical effects of judgments already entered in favor of 
others. 
In order to address that risk in cases involving large numbers of 
claimants,75 the authors of the 1966 revisions created the limited-fund 
subtype under Rule 23(b)(1)(B). By its terms, this subtype authorizes 
class treatment when “prosecuting separate actions by or against 
individual class members would create a risk of . . . adjudications with 
respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would 
be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the 
individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their 
ability to protect their interests.”76 The provision allows for the 
equitable distribution of a limited fund through a single class 
proceeding, eliminating the need for claimants to race to the 
courthouse in order to secure relief. 
3. Civil Rights and Rule 23(b)(2).  The injunctive civil-rights class 
action responded to a more recent set of cases, and a more immediate 
set of concerns, than the other two traditional class forms discussed 
above. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, civil-rights plaintiffs 
attempted to bring a number of cases on a class basis.77 In many 
cases—most famously, Brown v. Board of Education—they 
succeeded in obtaining class treatment and correspondingly broad 
orders for relief.78 Often this breadth occurred in spite of the 
 
 74. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing In re Katrina Canal Breaches 
Litigation, 628 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2010)); see also Kaplan, supra note 53, at 371–75 (discussing 
Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty, 365 F.2d 802 (3d Cir. 
1966), vacated sub. nom. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 
(1968)). 
 75. Kaplan, supra note 53, at 364–65. As noted, simultaneous reforms to Rule 19 addressed 
such risks in cases involving fewer claimants. See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text. 
 76. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B). 
 77. See Marcus, Flawed but Noble, supra note 24, at 678–95 (categorizing the three periods 
of increased desegregation litigation as the few years before Brown v. Board of Education, the 
five years after Brown, and the early 1960’s); Jack B. Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some 
Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFF. L. REV. 433, 468 (1960) (“The class action has recently been 
used extensively in the field of civil liberties . . . .”). 
 78. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“[P]laintiffs and others similarly 
situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained 
of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
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formalistic requirements imposed by the pre-1966 version of the class-
action rule, which appeared to prevent class-wide remedies in 
desegregation cases.79 Some judges, “[i]gnoring doctrinal constraints 
altogether . . . signaled that plaintiffs’ judgments in desegregation 
class actions would benefit all black schoolchildren included in the 
class definition,” even though the rule required a different result.80 
Other courts, however, refused to allow class treatment for 
desegregation and other civil-rights claims.81 Especially during the 
post-Brown period of Southern intransigence, many courts and 
legislatures engaged in legal strategies designed to limit the reach of 
the decision.82 These judicial and legislative strategies were mutually 
reinforcing: judges interpreted Brown as a prohibition on de jure 
discrimination rather than a requirement of integration, and 
legislatures “replaced de jure policies of segregation with mechanisms 
that purported to treat blacks as individuals but invariably produced 
the same segregated results.”83 For example, some states enacted 
pupil-assignment laws that allowed school boards to conduct an 
individualized, multiple-factor assessment of each student’s 
appropriate school placement.84 These replacement policies made 
dissimilarities within a potential class of African American students 
theoretically relevant to the class-certification analysis, and thus 
defeated requests for class treatment.85 
 
This is not to minimize the difficulties that civil-rights plaintiffs faced in securing enforcement of 
that relief. See, e.g., Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441 (1968) (noting that, more than 
thirteen years after Brown was decided, no white children and 85 percent of the African 
American children were attending one of the two schools in a defendant school district); 
DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 146–49 (5th ed. 2004) (describing 
resistance to desegregation in the decade following the Brown decision). 
 79. See Marcus, Flawed but Noble, supra note 24, at 681–83 (“Individual litigant 
preferences were theoretically relevant, even in cases challenging de jure, blanket policies 
because formally Fourteenth Amendment rights were several. But courts tended not to let 
abstract jural relationships alone hamstring class suits, taking a more realistic view of what these 
suits put at issue.”). 
 80. Marcus, History, supra note 48, at 601. 
 81. Marcus, Flawed but Noble, supra note 24, at 681–91. Some courts “emphasized the 
theoretical possibility, rather than the practical likelihood, that preferences among class 
members might diverge, and they refused class treatment on these grounds.” Id. at 683. Others 
“denied class treatment on grounds that individuals alone could choose when or how to 
vindicate their Fourteenth Amendment rights.” Id. at 685.  
 82. Id. at 683–86. 
 83. Id. at 683. 
 84. Id. at 684. 
 85. Id. at 685–86. 
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The unavailability of class treatment created serious problems 
for civil-rights plaintiffs. It could prevent them from obtaining any 
decision on the merits of their claims; for example, a school 
desegregation case might drag on until the individual plaintiffs had 
graduated, rendering the action moot.86 It could create additional 
obstacles to compliance; for example, even if an individual case did 
result in a broad remedial order, the intended beneficiaries might find 
themselves unable to enforce it because of their status as nonparties.87 
Most important, it could result in an order so narrow as to be 
meaningless—many judges at that time refused to grant system-wide 
relief to individual litigants in civil-rights cases.88 Some courts, upon 
holding that a desegregation plaintiff had proved his claim, would 
refuse to order any remedy beyond the admission of that one African 
American student to an otherwise all-white school.89 That remedial 
approach could result in integration only after multiple lawsuits and 
great expense. 
The creation of the injunctive civil-rights subtype can best be 
understood against this societal backdrop.90 Although the modern 
version of Rule 23 took effect in 1966, the authors began work on the 
revisions several years earlier.91 As Advisory Committee member 
John Frank explained, those revision efforts proceeded “in direct 
parallel to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the race relations echo of 
that decade was always in the committee room.”92 The drafters were 
well aware of the hurdles facing civil-rights plaintiffs in unsympathetic 
and hostile courts,93 as well as the inadequate relief that many of those 
 
 86. Id. at 679. 
 87. Id. at 679–80. 
 88. Id. at 680. 
 89. Id. at 710 (“The Fifth Circuit did not sanction an integration injunction in an individual 
suit until 1963, and regardless of this decision, recalcitrant district judges still cited a suit’s 
nonclass status to justify meaningless, individual-by-individual injunctions.” (footnote omitted)).  
 90. Cf. YEAZELL, supra note 27, at 21 (arguing that “[s]ocial context matters” to the 
understanding of procedural rules, especially those involving group litigation). 
 91. Arthur R. Miller, Comment, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, 
Reality, and the “Class Action Problem”, 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 670 n.31 (1979) (“Although not 
promulgated until 1966, the basic text of the current rule actually was drafted by the Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules in 1961 and 1962 . . . . [A]s a practical matter the contours of the new 
rule had become firm by 1964.”). 
 92. Frank, supra note 53, at 266.  
 93. For example, Dave Marcus recounts that in a letter to the principal author of the 1966 
revisions, Advisory Committee member Charles Alan Wright 
described a recent case where a well-known segregationist judge had denied class 
treatment, then limited the injunction desegregating the defendant’s bus lines to the 
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litigants obtained from individual-by-individual injunctions.94 This 
mismatch between remedy and harm had negative consequences not 
only for the other affected individuals, but also for judicial legitimacy 
and the rule of law.95 
With the need for system-wide responses to civil-rights claims 
specifically in mind,96 the authors of the 1966 revisions created Rule 
23(b)(2), which applies when “the party opposing the class has acted 
or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that 
final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is 
appropriate respecting the class as a whole.”97 As the authors noted, 
this subtype allows a court to “settl[e] the legality of the [defendant’s] 
behavior with respect to the class as a whole,”98 rather than through 
piecemeal litigation. If the court decides in favor of the class, all class 
members can rely on the resulting injunction or declaration. If the 
court decides in favor of the defendant, all class members are bound 
to that result. 
 
 
three named plaintiffs. Given how this judge manipulated procedure to achieve an 
unjust end, Wright argued, “[i]t is absolutely essential to the progress of integration 
that such suits be treated as class actions, with the judgment binding on all members 
of the class.”  
Marcus, Flawed but Noble, supra note 24, at 704–05 (alteration in original); see also Marcus, 
History, supra note 48, at 608 (noting “Rule 23’s use as an aid to desegregation lawsuits, the only 
real tool for civil rights enforcement before the 1964 Civil Rights Act”). 
 94. Marcus, Flawed but Noble, supra note 24, at 710.  
 95. YEAZELL, supra note 27, at 258 (arguing that the injunctive civil-rights subtype 
“expresses a strong preference, on grounds of seemliness, for consistency of outcome when 
similarly situated persons are involved” and reflects the drafters’ view of “the necessity of the 
legal order”); Carroll, supra note 28, at 2033; see also William B. Rubenstein, Procedure and 
Society: An Essay for Steve Yeazell, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 136, 136 (2013) (introducing 
the concept of “social loyalty,” which provides that the shape of litigation should correspond to 
the “shape of the social activity that gave rise to [it]”). 
 96. Arthur R. Miller, The Preservation and Rejuvenation of Aggregate Litigation: A 
Systemic Imperative, 64 EMORY L.J. 293, 294 (2014) (“The Committee’s motivation, in 
significant part, was to create a receptive procedural vehicle for the explosion of civil rights 
cases that followed the Supreme Court’s seminal 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education . . . .”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment 
(“Illustrative [of situations to which Rule 23(b)(2) would apply] are various actions in the civil-
rights field where a party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class, usually one 
whose members are incapable of specific enumeration.”). 
 97. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
 98. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment. 
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B. A Fourth Category “Deliberately Created” 
The final subtype created by the 1966 revisions, unlike the other 
three, did not result from the lessons of judicial experience with 
aggregate litigation. Nor did it result from the Advisory Committee’s 
search for the categories of “natural” class actions.99 Rather, it 
represented “a new category deliberately created,” and an 
“innovation[],” as its principal author described it.100 This subtype, the 
aggregated-damages class action, applies when “the court finds that 
the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate 
over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class 
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently 
adjudicating the controversy.”101 
Rule 23(b)(3) enables a representative plaintiff to bring a class 
action based on an aggregation of multiple damages claims. The 
Advisory Committee stated that classes certified under the 
aggregated-damages subtype could “achieve economies of time, 
effort, and expense,” as well as “promote[] uniformity of decision as 
to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness 
or bringing about other undesirable results.”102 Alternatively, by 
offering the potential for a larger overall recovery and thus a larger 
contingency fee,103 this subtype can create an economic incentive to 
litigation where none existed before. As Jack Weinstein wrote several 
years after the new rule’s adoption, “[m]atters which would not have 
been litigated can now be brought to court.”104 These efficiency and 
 
 99. Kaplan, supra note 53, at 387.  
 100. Id. at 399. The Supreme Court, many years later, referred to Rule 23(b)(3) as “‘the 
most adventuresome’ innovation.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997). 
 101. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). The rule goes on to describe “[t]he matters pertinent to these 
findings” of predominance and superiority, which includes  
(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense 
of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the 
controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or 
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and 
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.  
Id. 
 102. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment. 
 103. The sometime and uncertain inclusion of monetary damages claims in Rule 23(b)(2) 
class actions offers some potential for plaintiffs’ attorneys to secure a contingency fee through 
the injunctive civil-rights subtype, but that potential is limited by the requirement that such 
damages must be “incidental” to other forms of relief. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 
S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011).  
 104. Jack B. Weinstein, Some Reflections on the “Abusiveness” of Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 
299, 300 (1973). 
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litigation-generating purposes contrast sharply with the other 
subtypes’ focus on avoiding the unfair or unworkable outcomes of 
individual litigation.105 
The authors of the 1966 revisions had doubts as to whether they 
should include the aggregated-damages class action in their changes 
to Rule 23.106 The Advisory Committee’s Note described the subtype 
in remarkably tentative terms, noting that “[i]n the situations to 
which this subdivision relates, class-action treatment is not as clearly 
called for as in those described above, but it may nevertheless be 
convenient and desirable depending upon the particular facts.”107 In 
an article published in the year after the rule’s adoption, Benjamin 
Kaplan assured readers that “(b)(3) is well confined,”108 and that it 
“invites a close look at the case before it is accepted as a class action 
and even then requires that it be specially treated.”109 That special 
treatment includes express judicial findings of predominance and 
superiority, as well as notice and opt-out rights for members of the 
class—procedural protections not required under the other 
subtypes.110 
Notwithstanding these additional protections, the aggregated-
damages class action became the focus of criticism and controversy 
from the start.111 Moreover, although the authors of the 1966 revisions 
had envisioned a more limited use for the new subtype,112 the 
plaintiffs’ bar increasingly recognized the possibilities it presented for 
economic rewards, and they attempted to bring class actions in areas 
 
 105. As Bill Rubenstein has described it, the aggregated-damages subtype aims to produce 
positive externalities, whereas the other subtypes aim to prevent negative externalities. 
Rubenstein, supra note 71, at 722–23. 
 106. Frank, supra note 53, at 267 (“[T]he most sharply disputed question [among members 
of the Advisory Committee] was whether to have Rule (b)(3) at all.”). 
 107. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment. 
 108. Kaplan, supra note 53, at 395. 
 109. Id. at 390. 
 110. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). 
 111. As Kaplan noted, “[c]riticism of the draft new rule started with the suggestion that the 
rule should confine itself to the more ‘standard’ class actions of (b)(1) and (2) and stay out of 
the difficult terrain of (b)(3).” Kaplan, supra note 53, at 394. He rejected that “timid course” as 
“unthinkable.” Id. Later, he defended the need for the aggregated-damages subtype in terms of 
the class action’s “historic mission of taking care of the smaller guy.” Marvin E. Frankel, 
Amended Rule 23 from a Judge’s Point of View, 32 ANTITRUST L.J. 295, 299 (1966) (recounting 
a conversation between Frankel and Kaplan). 
 112. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (expressing 
the expectation that “mass accident” cases would not be appropriate for class-action 
certification). 
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ranging from mass torts to consumer claims.113 Unsurprisingly, 
defendants resisted these efforts,114 and before long, “segments of the 
bench and bar [were] waging a holy war” over the class-action rule.115 
Stories of class counsel engaging in “undesirable or unprofessional 
conduct” became commonplace, notwithstanding objections that such 
“abuse does not appear to have been widespread,”116 and that “to the 
extent there are difficulties they center around . . . class actions under 
rule 23(b)(3), rather than actions under subdivision (b)(1) or 
(b)(2).”117 
Due in large part to the creativity of the plaintiffs’ bar with 
regard to the aggregated-damages subtype, the other subtypes now 
represent a minority of class actions. But they are a significant 
minority, not only in number, but also in importance.118 The 
conditions that created a need for the traditional subtypes, having 
existed for decades or even centuries, have not suddenly disappeared. 
As the next Part explains, however, those subtypes have played a 
nearly invisible role in the development of class-action law over the 
past two decades. 
II.  THE LIMITED TERMS OF THE CLASS-ACTION DEBATE 
Courts and commentators have long weighed the costs and 
benefits of the class-action device when debating its appropriate level 
of availability.119 In its current form, that debate involves vigorous 
disputes over issues relating to settlement pressure, attorney 
overcompensation, and the expense and delay associated with class 
 
 113. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 1, at 521 (“The dominant legal debate of the 1980s and 
1990s focused on the use of the class action to resolve mass tort litigation.”). For a discussion of 
an aggregated-damages class action brought under consumer-protection laws, see supra note 13 
and accompanying text. 
 114. See Benjamin Kaplan, Comment on Carrington, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2125, 2127 (1989) 
(“[I]t did not escape attention at the time [of the 1966 revisions] that [Rule 23(b)(3)] would 
open the way to the assertion of many, many claims that otherwise would not be pressed; so the 
rule would stick in the throats of establishment defendants.”).  
 115. Miller, supra note 91, at 664. 
 116. Id. at 666–67. 
 117. Id. at 667 n.18. 
 118. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text. 
 119. Jay Tidmarsh, Superiority as Unity, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 565, 572 (2013) (“The standard 
answer toward which most scholars in the debate gravitate balances the costs against the 
benefits; although different scholars weigh the costs and benefits differently (and hence come to 
different conclusions about the proper breadth of modern class actions), the methodology is the 
same . . . .”). 
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treatment, among other topics. Over the past two decades, the class 
action’s proponents and opponents alike120 have tended to frame these 
disputes in a manner that neglects the existence of the logical-
indivisibility, limited-fund, and injunctive civil-rights class-action 
subtypes. 
It bears noting that the following analysis does not depend on 
whether the concerns described below are well taken in the context of 
the aggregated-damages class action.121 I will note my view, however, 
that these concerns have varying degrees of validity and import within 
that context. Arguments that plaintiffs’ counsel in aggregated-
damages class actions are overcompensated, for example, are often 
overstated (especially when unaccompanied by any inquiry into the 
compensation received by defense counsel), whereas concerns about 
the settlement pressure arising from certification of an aggregated-
damages class sometimes carry more weight (especially as a 
justification for interlocutory appeals from class-certification 
decisions). My purpose in this Part is not to take a position with 
respect to these disputes in the context of the aggregated-damages 
class action. Rather, my argument is that even if one agrees that each 
of these concerns justifies restricting the availability of the 
aggregated-damages class action, the justification (as currently 
articulated and examined) does not extend to restrictions on the other 
subtypes.122 
 
 120. For simplicity, I refer to those who generally favor greater availability of class 
treatment as proponents of the class action, and those who generally favor greater restrictions as 
its opponents. In some ways this is an oversimplification, but in others it represents a true divide 
in the political and scholarly debate. See Resnik, supra note 27, at 145–48. 
 121. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). For an argument that does depend on the validity of concerns 
about the aggregated-damages class action, see Mullenix, supra note 36, at 440. Mullenix 
expresses concern about the ascendancy of the aggregated-damages class action, id. at 428, and 
argues that a juridical “category creep” (similar, but not equivalent, to the myopia that I 
describe here) “has significantly undermined the utility of these different [Rule 23(b)] class 
categories,” id. at 426. In light of her view that a great deal of the criticism of the aggregated-
damages class action is warranted, she “advocates a return to a simpler class action rule limited 
to injunctive relief cases, with abandonment of the Rule 23(b)(3) damage class action.” Id. at 
405. In contrast, I argue here that the purposes and effects of Rule 23(b)(3) should be 
distinguished from those of the other class forms, not that the aggregated-damages provision 
should be abolished. See infra Part V.B. 
 122. At the same time, examining these concerns in the context of the other subtypes may 
reveal ways in which they fall short even for a subset of aggregated-damages class actions. See 
infra Part II.C. 
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A. Settlement Pressure 
Those who favor greater restrictions on class actions often raise 
the specter of “blackmail”123 or “in terrorem”124 settlements, in which a 
defendant pays to settle a case not because of its merits, but because 
class certification has increased the stakes of the litigation beyond 
what the defendant can bear.125 Scholars raised concerns about 
settlement pressure as early as 1971,126 but the issue did not gain 
widespread traction until 1995, when the Seventh Circuit decided In 
re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.127 In that influential opinion, Judge 
Posner expressed his concern that class certification could 
“forc[e] . . . defendants to stake their companies on the outcome of a 
single jury trial, or be forced by fear of the risk of bankruptcy to settle 
even if they have no legal liability.”128 In the intervening years, the 
notion that judges should guard against uses of the class action that 
result in irresistible settlement pressure has gained credence among 
courts and scholars.129 
 
 123. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[C]lass 
certification creates insurmountable pressure on defendants to settle . . . . These settlements 
have been referred to as judicial blackmail.” (citations omitted)). 
 124. See, e.g., Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 331 F.3d 13, 22 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that 
aggregated damages in class actions could create “an in terrorem effect on defendants, which 
may induce unfair settlements”). 
 125. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1015–16 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(arguing that class treatment “makes the case so unwieldy, and the stakes so large, that 
settlement becomes almost inevitable—and at a price that reflects the risk of a catastrophic 
judgment as much as, if not more than, the actual merit of the claims”). 
 126. Milton Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust 
Suits—The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971) (“Any device 
which is workable only because it utilizes the threat of unmanageable and expensive litigation to 
compel settlement is not a rule of procedure—it is a form of legalized blackmail.”); see also 
HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 120 (1973) (coining the term “blackmail 
settlement”). 
 127. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 128. Id. at 1299. 
 129. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011) (“Other 
courts have noted the risk of ‘in terrorem’ settlements that class actions entail . . . .”); Robert G. 
Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1254 
(2002) (“Loose certification standards risk high costs by inviting frivolous class action suits that 
defendants settle rather than face potentially crippling, even bankrupting, damage awards.”); 
Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: 
Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1379 (2000) (examining possible 
procedural solutions to the problem of certification-induced settlement pressure); Richard A. 
Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitration, 
and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1878 (2006) (“This is not to say that class settlement 
pressure is absent from such cases, only that the law should not regard it as objectionable.”). 
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Of course, the blackmail thesis also has its critics: courts and 
scholars have questioned it on both empirical and normative 
grounds.130 Some have pointed to the lack of evidence that defendants 
actually experience bet-the-company levels of settlement pressure 
because of class certification, or that settlements in fact result from 
certification-induced pressure, as opposed to pressure arising from 
the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims.131 Others have argued that courts 
have no authority to consider settlement pressure as a factor in 
certification decisions, as no such provision appears in the class-action 
rule.132 Finally, some have disputed that there is anything unfair about 
the increased settlement pressure associated with class certification, 
as it results only from the scope of the defendant’s own activity.133 
Notwithstanding the disagreements between them, both sides of 
this debate start from the assumption that class certification does in 
fact increase the stakes involved in the litigation, in the sense of 
increasing the total amount that the defendant would have to pay if it 
lost the case. To be sure, this assumption will always hold true for the 
aggregated-damages class action, because the joining together of 
multiple monetary claims necessarily increases the defendant’s 
potential liability. Whatever the size of the claims, summing up two 
monetary values produces a total greater than either one taken alone. 
What has gone largely unnoticed, however, is that the 
assumption of increased liability often does not hold true for subtypes 
other than the aggregated-damages class action.134 For example, the 
 
 130. See generally Alexandra D. Lahav, Symmetry and Class Action Litigation, 60 UCLA L. 
REV. 1494 (2013) (showing that courts inconsistently accept settlements of meritless claims 
despite criticizing the tendency of class actions to blackmail defendants); Charles Silver, “We’re 
Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003) (arguing 
that the blackmail thesis lacks a persuasive normative explanation). 
 131. See, e.g., Silver, supra note 130, at 1359 (“The authors of a Federal Judicial Center 
study doubt that ‘the certification decision itself, as opposed to the merits of the underlying 
claims, coerce[s] settlements with any frequency.’”). But see Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the 
Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 524 
(1991) (contending that securities settlements do not reflect the merits of the case). 
 132. Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1275 (11th Cir. 2004); Lahav, supra note 130, at 
1513. 
 133. See Lahav, supra note 130, at 1519 (contending that class actions allow the plaintiff 
class to “stand on equal footing with an organizational defendant with the same capacity to 
pursue a lawsuit,” which the class members could not do as individuals); Silver, supra note 130, 
at 1366 (noting that a defendant’s decision to settle for fear of losing at trial “is a reason for 
thinking the defendant is right to settle, not for thinking the defendant is coerced”). 
 134. For a notable exception, see Robert G. Bone, Sorting Through the Certification 
Muddle, 63 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 105, 113 (2010) (arguing that “the amount of improper 
leverage certification creates . . . is likely to vary with the type of class action involved”). 
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very nature of logically indivisible relief is that the remedy available 
to a single claimant is the same as the remedy available to a group of 
claimants.135 No matter whether one or many residents seek a 
particular change in a city’s emergency-preparedness plan, the cost of 
making that change will remain the same; no matter whether one or 
many customers request that a restaurant build a wheelchair ramp, 
the cost of building that ramp will not change; no matter whether one 
or many neighbors complain about the fumes emanating from a hot 
sauce plant, the cost of containing the fumes will not be affected. In 
these types of cases, although many factors may affect the defendant’s 
potential liability, the mere fact of class treatment does not. The same 
is true of limited-fund class actions,136 which are available only when 
factors unrelated to the litigation limit the amount of money the 
defendant might be required to pay.137 
Prior to 2011, the link between certification and settlement 
pressure was more complicated in cases brought pursuant to the 
injunctive civil-rights subtype. At that time, courts routinely included 
claims for individualized monetary relief in classes certified under 
Rule 23(b)(2), creating a scaling-up effect similar to that involved in 
aggregated-damages class actions. In its 2011 decision in Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, however, the Supreme Court held that the 
members of a class certified under the injunctive civil-rights subtype 
could not seek individualized monetary relief.138 Accordingly, 
although litigants may seek certification of an aggregated-damages 
class contemporaneously with certification of an injunctive civil-rights 
class, the latter should not itself entail the aggregation of 
individualized monetary claims. 
To be sure, a defendant may well face pressure to settle a case 
that does not involve the aggregation of monetary claims. The cost of 
implementing an injunction, for example, may reach into the millions 
 
 135. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.04 cmt. a (AM. LAW 
INST. 2010). 
 136. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B). 
 137. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999) (“[A]pplicants for contested 
certification on this rationale must show the fund is limited by more than the agreement of the 
parties . . . .”). 
 138. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557–60 (2011). In addition to this 
holding about Rule 23(b)(2) and claims for individualized monetary relief, the Wal-Mart Court 
issued a holding addressing commonality, as discussed infra Part III.E. 
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of dollars.139 In contrast to the aggregated-damages class action, 
however, for which the cost of the remedy necessarily increases with 
the number of people in the class,140 the cost of a system-wide 
injunction will often be independent of the size or existence of the 
class.141 The cost of such an injunction depends on the expense 
associated with changing the defendant’s generally applicable 
conduct, rather than the expense associated with delivering an 
individualized remedy to each class member. Moreover, even when 
logically indivisible relief is not at issue, a court might award system-
wide relief to an individual plaintiff, further attenuating the 
relationship between class treatment and remedial cost.142 
Accordingly, although subtypes other than the aggregated-damages 
class action can involve significant settlement pressure, class 
treatment is not usually the source of that pressure. 
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the connection between 
class certification and settlement pressure requires separate analysis 
under each class-action subtype. But courts and scholars have 
generally failed to recognize the need for this differentiated 
analysis—class-action myopia has instead led the debate to proceed 
on the basis of mere assumptions, which remain unexamined precisely 
because they hold true in the context of the aggregated-damages 
subtype. Indeed, scholarship discussing certification-induced 
settlement pressure has routinely neglected even to mention that the 
 
 139. See, e.g., Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Schs., 668 F.3d 481, 491 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting 
that the injunction ordered by the district court would cost millions of dollars to implement); see 
also infra Part IV.A (discussing the appellate decision in Jamie S.). 
 140. For discussion of this scaling-up effect from individual to class-wide remedies in the 
context of the aggregated-damages class action, see supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text. 
 141. Exceptions exist in which the number of class members will directly increase the cost of 
an injunction. For example, enjoining the collection of a tax from all taxpayers will cost 
proportionally more than enjoining it only as to an individual plaintiff. Cf. Richards v. Jefferson 
Cty., 517 U.S. 793 (1996). However, exceptions also exist in which the direct economic cost of a 
class-wide remedy will be less than the direct economic cost of individual relief. For example, in 
Klayman v. Obama, the district court ordered the National Security Agency (NSA) to stop 
collecting telephone metadata only as to two individual plaintiffs. 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 43 (D.D.C. 
2013). The NSA would thus continue to incur the costs of operating the metadata program, and 
to take additional actions to identify and disaggregate the information specific to those two 
individuals, id. at 43 n.70, as opposed to terminating the program altogether.  
 142. Most of the recent litigation about marriage rights for same-sex couples, for example, 
has proceeded on a nonclass basis yet has resulted in state-wide remedial orders. See, e.g., 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2660 (2013) (noting that the District Court declared 
Proposition 8 unconstitutional, enjoined its enforcement by the California officials named as 
defendants, and directed those officials not to permit its enforcement by anyone under their 
control or supervision). 
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other subtypes exist.143 Thus, although the debate over settlement 
pressure purports to be a debate about the class action writ large, on 
its current terms it amounts to a debate only about the aggregated-
damages class action. 
B. Attorney Overcompensation 
The myopic focus on the aggregated-damages class action is not 
limited to disputes over settlement pressure, as disagreements over 
compensation for class counsel demonstrate. On one side of this 
disagreement, those who would limit the availability of the class 
action argue that plaintiffs’ counsel receive excessive attorney’s fees 
in class litigation.144 Members of the public tend to agree: “[P]ublic 
attitudes about plaintiffs’ class action lawyers have often been 
strongly negative,”145 fueled in large part by stories of attorneys who 
receive huge contingency fees while class members receive little to no 
monetary relief.146 
As with settlement pressure, scholars have responded to the 
charges of overcompensation both empirically and normatively. Some 
have noted that, contrary to political rhetoric and popular belief, 
attorney’s fees for class counsel have not in fact increased over time, 
and that “[f]ees and costs decline as a percent of the recovery as the 
recovery amount increases, suggesting the efficiency of this form of 
aggregate litigation.”147 Others have pointed to the deterrent function 
of class litigation, arguing that attorney compensation needs to be 
high enough to encourage class actions that deter harmful conduct.148 
 
 143. See generally Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 129 (analyzing the blackmail charge in the 
context of Rule 23(b)(3)); Silver, supra note 130 (analyzing the blackmail charge largely in the 
context of Rule 23(b)(3), but including a reference to a particular limited-fund class action 
decision).  
 144. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 14 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 15. 
 145. Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the 
Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 117–18 (noting 
that courts and lawmakers have also expressed negative views of class counsel). 
 146. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
2043, 2043–44 (2010) (“Class action lawyers are some of the most frequently derided players in 
our system of civil litigation. The focus of this ire is usually the ‘take’ that class action lawyers 
receive from class action settlements.”). 
 147. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees and Expenses in Class Action 
Settlements: 1993–2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 248, 281 (2010); see also Fitzpatrick, supra 
note 146, at 2045–46 (noting that the percentage fee received by class counsel is lower on 
average than the typical contingency fee in an individual case). 
 148. Fitzpatrick, supra note 146, at 2046–47. 
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At times, this discussion looks like an argument over who is the 
fatter cat, with the class action’s opponents pointing to class counsel 
who reap huge fee awards (despite doing little to earn them), and its 
proponents pointing to companies that reap huge profits (despite 
engaging in harmful activity).149 Nonprofit public-interest lawyers 
seldom appear as characters in this drama. Just as the phrase “class 
action” is unlikely to make most people think of Brown v. Board of 
Education,150 the phrase “class-action lawyer” is unlikely to make 
them think of Thurgood Marshall. Yet Brown was no less a class 
action than the consumer or securities cases that might come to mind, 
and Marshall was no less a class-action lawyer than the attorneys who 
bring those cases. 
More generally, what the compensation debate neglects to 
recognize is that some class actions cannot generate huge contingency 
fees, or indeed any contingency fees, because they do not seek 
monetary relief. For example, consider class actions seeking only 
injunctive or declaratory relief pursuant to the civil-rights subtype.151 
Such actions can yield a court-ordered attorney’s fee only if a fee-
shifting statute applies.152 Even then, absent exceptional 
circumstances, class counsel will at most receive a reasonable hourly 
rate for the hours reasonably spent on the litigation;153 the typical 
award will fall below counsel’s market rate for hours actually 
worked.154 Indeed, many successful cases covered by a fee-shifting 
 
 149. This aspect of the class-action debate thus resembles political discussions of litigation 
and litigiousness in the early 1990s, when Republicans tried to focus the conversation on greedy 
“trial lawyers” and Democrats aimed to redirect it to “well-heeled corporate interests.” See 
Stephen C. Yeazell, Unspoken Truths and Misaligned Interests: Political Parties and the Two 
Cultures of Civil Litigation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1752, 1757–62 (2013). 
 150. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 486 (1954) (deciding four consolidated class 
actions from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware).  
 151. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
 152. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 267–68 (1975) (holding 
that prevailing parties in federal litigation can recover their attorney’s fees only through 
statutory authorization); see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2012) (permitting a prevailing party to 
recover a reasonable attorney’s fee in litigation brought pursuant to enumerated civil-rights 
statutes). 
 153. See Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 1673 (2010) (holding that enhancing 
attorney’s fees will only be allowed in “rare” and “exceptional” circumstances). Fee awards 
cannot be adjusted to reflect the contingent nature of the fee. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 
U.S. 557, 567 (1992).  
 154. See generally Jean R. Sternlight, The Supreme Court’s Denial of Reasonable Attorney’s 
Fees to Prevailing Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 535 (1990) 
(describing the economic hardship that civil-rights plaintiffs’ attorneys endure due to fee 
restrictions). Courts can refuse to compensate the attorneys for the hours actually worked if 
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statute will yield no fee at all.155 As with settlement pressure, 
compensation issues play out differently in the context of each class-
action subtype, but the current class-action debate fails to recognize 
or account for those differences. 
C. Delay and Expense 
The same unrecognized limitation affects discussions of the delay 
and expense associated with the class-action device. Critics complain 
that class proceedings cost too much and take too long, with the effect 
of clogging court dockets, delaying relief to class members, and 
miring defendants in protracted litigation.156 The class action’s 
proponents largely concede that class proceedings consume more 
time and money than nonclass litigation, but argue that those 
additional costs are necessary to ensure that absent class members 
will be protected and that the necessary deterrence will be achieved.157 
The underlying assumption, on both sides, is that class actions are 
more expensive and time-consuming because they are class actions. 
 
they deem the reported time unreasonable; for example, they may determine that a firm 
assigned more attorneys than necessary for a particular assignment, or that an attorney working 
on an assignment took more time than it should have required. In addition, “the product of 
hours reasonably expended on the litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly rate” must be 
reduced based on the “degree of success obtained” in the litigation, “even where the plaintiff’s 
claims were interrelated, nonfrivolous, and raised in good faith.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 
424, 436 (1983). 
 155. For example, if a defendant makes a settlement offer that includes a waiver of 
attorney’s fees, the plaintiff’s attorney may be ethically obligated to accept it on the client’s 
behalf. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986) (approving such offers); MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (requiring an attorney to “abide by a client’s 
decision whether to settle a matter”); see also Paul D. Reingold, Requiem for Section 1983, 3 
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 2 (2008) (discussing the impact of Evans v. Jeff D. on fee-
shifting plaintiffs). Alternatively, if a defendant moots the case by unilaterally changing its 
conduct in the manner the plaintiff requested, the court will award no fees. Buckhannon Bd. & 
Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 600 (2001); see 
generally Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil Rights: 
The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1087 
(2007) (discussing the impact of Buckhannon on fee-shifting plaintiffs). 
 156. See, for example, the discussion of the expense and delay involved in class proceedings 
in the Supreme Court’s recent decisions interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act. See, e.g., Am. 
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013) (“[T]he switch from bilateral to 
class arbitration . . . sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—and 
makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final 
judgment.” (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011))); Stolt-
Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685–86 (2010) (noting that class 
arbitrations are less likely than bilateral arbitrations to receive the benefits of “lower costs, 
greater efficiency and speed”); see also infra Part III.D. 
 157. See, e.g., Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1759–60 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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The assumption of increased time and effort holds true for the 
negative-value aggregated-damages class action, because in the 
absence of class treatment, little to no litigation would in fact occur.158 
Beyond that context, however, the issue becomes much murkier. To 
be sure, class certification proceedings take up courts’ and litigants’ 
time, and are not required in a nonclass case.159 Yet the effect of those 
proceedings, when certification is granted, is to collapse multiple 
lawsuits (whether actual or potential) into one. More important, to 
the extent that the question is whether to increase the obstacles to 
class treatment, it must focus on postcertification delay and expense. 
Certification-related delay and expense would otherwise lead to 
obstacles that further increase certification-related delay and expense 
in an endless, one-way ratchet. 
In terms of post-certification delay and expense, the class-action 
device can enable some lengthy and expensive litigation, involving 
extensive briefing and discovery. However, it also can enable the 
efficient, class-wide resolution of a purely legal question, involving no 
discovery at all. For example, in Doe v. Marion County,160 the plaintiff 
brought an injunctive civil-rights class action challenging, on First 
Amendment grounds, an Indiana statute that prohibited registered 
sex offenders from using social-networking websites. He filed his 
complaint on June 27, 2012, and the Seventh Circuit resolved the 
“single legal question” presented by the case only nineteen months 
later, on January 23, 2013.161 
Moreover, some of the “big” injunctive civil-rights class actions 
would be resource-intensive even if they proceeded on a nonclass 
basis. Consider California prison litigation. Before there was 
Coleman/Plata,162 a massive and ongoing pair of class actions 
addressing prison overcrowding, there was Johnson v. California,163 a 
nonclass case addressing inmate segregation. Although the latter 
 
 158. A negative-value class action is one in which the expected costs of litigation exceed the 
expected monetary recovery. As noted, the application of the aggregated-damages class action 
is not limited to negative-value claims. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 159. See Carroll, supra note 28, at 2063–65 (discussing the effect of certification burdens on 
plaintiffs’ incentives and disincentives to pursuing class treatment). 
 160. Doe v. Marion Cty., 705 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 161. Id. at 697. 
 162. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). The Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. 
Plata (like the decision of the three-judge district court below) encompassed two class actions: 
Coleman v. Brown, which involves prisoners with serious mental disorders, and Plata v. Brown, 
which involves prisoners with serious medical conditions. See id. at 1922. 
 163. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005). 
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proceeded in the absence of class treatment, it nonetheless consumed 
over a decade of courts’ and litigants’ time, and it resulted in a state-
wide, structural consent decree.164 
In some types of cases, class treatment can actually save both 
time and money, accelerating the provision of relief to the claimants. 
For example, in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,165 the litigants attempted to 
settle asbestos litigation under the limited-fund subtype.166 When the 
case reached the U.S. Supreme Court,167 the entire Court agreed that 
“the elephantine mass of asbestos cases . . . defies customary judicial 
administration.”168 The defendant had faced thousands of asbestos 
claims over a period of decades, and new claimants continued to 
come forward on a regular basis. The proposed class settlement 
would have stopped this flood, providing compensation for the 
claimants, closure for the company, and docket relief for the courts. 
Because the Court determined that the litigation was not amenable to 
class treatment, however, the company and claimants were instead 
“consigned to the endless waiting that characterizes asbestos 
bankruptcies.”169 This is not to say that the class settlement in Ortiz 
should have been approved. My point is only that class treatment 
would have saved time and money, a possibility that the current class-
action debate largely neglects. 
The aggregation of monetary claims large enough to proceed 
individually, like those in Ortiz, can create efficiencies by reducing 
the duplication of effort by judges and litigants in factually and legally 
 
 164. See id. at 503 (noting that the plaintiff filed his complaint on February 24, 1995); 
Settlement and Release Agreement, Johnson v. California, No. 01-56436, 336 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 
2003) (signed on December 12, 2005), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-
0041-0001.pdf [http://perma.cc/5PFP-FBW8]. 
 165. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1998). 
 166. Id. at 816. 
 167. The case remained live after the parties agreed to settle it because under Rule 23(e) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a class action may not be settled without judicial approval, 
and class members who object to a proposed settlement may appeal that approval. See, e.g., 
Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 1 (2002) (holding that “non-named class members . . . who 
have objected in a timely manner to approval of a settlement at a fairness hearing have the 
power to bring an appeal”). 
 168. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 821; id. at 865 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); id. at 866 (Breyer, J., 
concurring). 
 169. Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1475, 
1476 (2005); see also RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 108 
(2007) (noting that much of the asbestos litigation after Ortiz and Amchem has proceeded 
through asbestos-related reorganizations under the Bankruptcy Code, which disserve claimants 
“in ways that make the qualms about the Amchem and Ortiz class settlements seem mild by 
comparison”). 
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similar cases. These potential efficiency gains exist regardless of 
whether the aggregation occurs pursuant to the limited-fund class 
action or the aggregated-damages class action—under either subtype, 
discovery between the plaintiffs and the defendant will be bilateral 
rather than multilateral, and common questions will be decided in 
one proceeding rather than several.170 An analysis of the other 
subtypes thus reveals that this aspect of the current debate has been 
limited in its focus, not only to the aggregated-damages class action, 
but to the negative-value aggregated-damages class action. 
D. Other Topics of Debate 
What is true of the foregoing topics is true of many others. 
Discussions of litigant autonomy,171 agency costs,172 distortion of 
substantive law,173 and institutional competence174 all have focused 
almost exclusively on the aggregated-damages class action, resulting 
 
 170. To some degree, aggregation through the multi-district litigation statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1407 (“the MDL statute”) also offers these potential efficiency gains. See, e.g., In re Bank of 
N.Y. Mellon Corp. Foreign Exch. Transactions Litig., 857 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1373 (J.P.M.L. 2012) 
(“Centralization [pursuant to the MDL statute,] will avoid duplicative discovery, eliminate the 
risk of inconsistent pretrial rulings, and conserve the resources of the parties, their counsel, and 
the judiciary.”). The MDL statute, however, allows consolidation only for pretrial matters; if not 
settled, individual cases must be transferred back to their originating courts before trial. 
Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 26 (1998). 
 171. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 21, 24 (1996) (discussing concerns about litigant autonomy, and stating that “the class 
action could be viewed as a device to fund the private attorney general and is able to play that 
role because of the aggregation of the claims of a large number of persons who have similar or 
identical claims, none of which—standing alone—would justify the suit.”). But see Samuel 
Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the Right to Opt Out of Class Actions, 77 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1057, 1058 (2002) (noting that an individual’s effective degree of litigant 
autonomy differs in situations governed by the injunctive civil-rights and limited-fund subtypes 
as compared to the aggregated-damages subtype). 
 172. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing 
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 879 & n.5, 882–83 
(1987) (discussing concerns about agency costs, and acknowledging the existence of Rules 
23(b)(1) and (b)(2) in a footnote, but arguing that the description of the plaintiff’s lawyer as an 
“independent entrepreneur” rather than “as an agent of the client” applies across the 
substantive areas in which class actions are brought). 
 173. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation, Amplification, and Distortion, 
2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 475, 477–78 (discussing the distortion of substantive law, and stating that 
“the theory of class actions is to take a weak signal and to amplify it by aggregating small claims 
that would not otherwise be pursued individually, lowering the cost per individual suit”). 
 174. See, e.g., Richard A. Nagareda, Class Actions in the Administrative State: Kalven and 
Rosenfield Revisited, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 610 (2008) (discussing concerns about institutional 
competence, and making only a brief reference to “the unusual settings” for class treatment 
under subtypes other than the aggregated-damages class action). 
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in a conceptually incomplete debate over the costs and benefits of the 
class-action device.175 The class action’s opponents and proponents 
have found common ground, but that common ground represents 
only a portion of the territory covered by the class-action rule. Even 
the most respected and accomplished attorneys and scholars have at 
times limited their analysis in this manner. For example, consider 
John Frank, a highly regarded scholar and advocate who served on 
the rulemaking committee that drafted the modern class-action rule 
in the early 1960s.176 Writing in the mid-1990s, Frank described the 
rule’s origins and subtypes, then went on to discuss what he viewed as 
the problems with the rule.177 The concerns that he identified in that 
discussion related only to the aggregated-damages subtype. He 
concluded that “the modern class action . . . ha[d] become a legal 
mechanism out of control,”178 yet the analysis supported only the 
conclusion that the aggregated-damages class action was a mechanism 
out of control. If the luminaries who designed the modern rule can 
fall prey to class-action myopia, it should come as no surprise that 
others do as well. 
III.  THE UNDIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS OF THE  
CLASS-ACTION DEBATE 
The current concerns about the class-action device have been 
debated within the limited context of the aggregated-damages class 
action,179 largely neglecting considerations related to the other 
subtypes set forth in the rule.180 Even as the class-action debate has 
narrowed in focus, however, its products have multiplied in scope and 
effect. As this Part explains, over a period beginning roughly in the 
 
 175. I do not mean to suggest that these concerns have no salience under any of the other 
subtypes; some do, to varying degrees. See infra Part V.A. But the criticisms have their origin in 
the aggregated-damages class action, and their applicability to the other subtypes has gone 
largely unexamined. 
 176. See generally John Q. Barrett, Teacher, Student, Ticket: John Frank, Leon 
Higginbotham, and One Afternoon at the Supreme Court—Not A Trifling Thing, 20 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 311 (2002) (describing the success of Frank as a professor and advocate); Jonathan 
L. Entin, In Memoriam: John P. Frank (November 10, 1917–September 7, 2002), 53 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 239 (2002) (chronicling the efforts of Frank that led to the widespread recognition 
of his success). Frank dissented from the inclusion of the aggregated-damages subtype in the 
revised rule. Frank, supra note 53, at 267. 
 177. Frank, supra note 53, at 264–70, 273–77. 
 178. Id. at 282. 
 179. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).  
 180. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), (b)(2). 
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mid-1990s,181 courts and lawmakers have imposed a series of 
significant, across-the-board restrictions on class actions. 
A. Interlocutory Appeals 
The perceived connection between class certification and 
settlement pressure has driven, in whole or in part, multiple efforts to 
restrict the availability of the class-action device.182 In particular, a 
1998 amendment to the class-action rule relied heavily on the concern 
that class certification would lead to “in terrorem” settlements—that 
is, compromises that reflect the defendant’s fear of a massive damages 
award rather than the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims.183 Other 
motivations for the amendment included the fear that denial of class 
treatment would effectively end the plaintiff’s case, and the need to 
promote the development of appellate law about class certification.184 
The 1998 amendment added Rule 23(f),185 which makes class 
certification decisions subject to interlocutory review at the discretion 
of the appellate court.186 The Advisory Committee notes to the 
amendment make its primary motivations clear: 
[S]everal concerns justify expansion of present opportunities to 
appeal. An order denying certification may confront the plaintiff 
 
 181. As Robert Klonoff has noted, “for many years following the adoption of the modern 
federal class action rule (Rule 23) in 1966, most courts believed that the class action device was 
a salutary tool for the administration of justice. This perception has changed to a significant 
degree [in more recent times].” Klonoff, supra note 8, at 732; see also Robert G. Bone, The 
Misguided Search for Class Unity, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 651, 677 (2014) (“The liberal attitude 
toward Rule 23, characteristic of the Rule’s early period, began to change in the 1990s.”). 
 182. Robert G. Bone, Walking the Class Action Maze: Toward a More Functional Rule 23, 
46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1097, 1110 (2013) (“[T]here is no doubt that concerns about improper 
settlement leverage have had a major impact on class action decisions since the late 1990s.”). 
For a discussion of the limited terms of the debate over settlement pressure, see supra Part II.A. 
 183. Klonoff, supra note 8, at 740–41; see also Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1275 
(11th Cir. 2004) (explaining that fears that class certification would cause undue settlement 
pressure “were the main reason behind the enactment of Rule 23(f)”). 
 184. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1998 amendment. 
 185. The full text of Rule 23(f) reads: 
A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or denying class-
action certification under this rule if a petition for permission to appeal is filed with 
the circuit clerk within 14 days after the order is entered. An appeal does not stay 
proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the court of appeals so 
orders. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
 186. Id. An “interlocutory” appeal is one taken from an order or judgment that does not 
end the case. See Interlocutory, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining 
“interlocutory” as “interim or temporary; not constituting a final resolution of the whole 
controversy”). 
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with a situation in which the only sure path to appellate review is by 
proceeding to final judgment on the merits of an individual claim 
that, standing alone, is far smaller than the costs of litigation. An 
order granting certification, on the other hand, may force a 
defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of defending a class 
action and run the risk of potentially ruinous liability.187 
These concerns, involving settlement pressure and negative-value 
monetary claims, have been debated almost exclusively within the 
context of the aggregated-damages class action.188 Yet Rule 23(f) 
opens up the possibility of interlocutory review for all class-
certification decisions, not just those involving monetary relief.189 
Although the rule allows either party to seek interlocutory 
review, Robert Klonoff has demonstrated that “in terms of sheer 
numbers, Rule 23(f) has served primarily as a device to protect 
defendants.”190 Of all the appeals accepted from the provision’s 
effective date through May 2012, more than two-thirds resulted from 
a defendant’s request for review of a grant of class certification, and 
defendants secured reversal in approximately 70 percent of those 
appeals in which their request was granted.191 Conversely, “even when 
plaintiffs convinced the appellate court to grant review, they lost in 
the majority of cases.”192 
A subtype-specific analysis of these Rule 23(f) appeals reveals 
that plaintiffs fared at least as badly in the appellate courts when 
attempting to invoke the traditional subtypes as when attempting to 
 
 187. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1998 amendment. 
 188. The other concern referenced in this excerpt, regarding the potential lack of economic 
viability for an individual claim, represents a version of the “death knell” thesis. This recognizes 
that a plaintiff with an individually small damages claim may abandon the litigation if the court 
denies certification, because in the absence of aggregation, the potential recovery (and 
contingency fee) will not be worth the candle. See generally Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 
U.S. 463 (1978) (analyzing the death knell thesis). As with concerns about settlement pressure, 
this analysis tends to assume that all class-action subtypes will increase the potential recovery 
for the class (and thus the potential contingency fee). For an explanation of why this assumption 
fails, see supra Part II.A. 
 189. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (creating no distinction among class-action subtypes or relief 
sought). 
 190. Klonoff, supra note 8, at 741; see also Malveaux, supra note 38, at 505 (“Even when 
employees and other civil rights litigants are successful at class certification, their success runs 
the risk of being short lived because of increased access to appellate review.”). 
 191. Klonoff, supra note 8, at 741. This high reversal rate results in part from the changes 
discussed infra in Parts III.B–E, which constrain the availability of the class-action device by 
“impos[ing] new hurdles that make certification even more challenging for plaintiffs.” Id. 
 192. Id. 
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rely on the aggregated-damages subtype.193 For example, considering 
only those appeals involving the injunctive civil-rights subtype, 
defendants won reversal in more than three-quarters of cases in which 
the district court granted certification, while plaintiffs won reversal in 
only one-third of cases in which the district court denied 
certification.194 Accordingly, the effect of the rule has been to increase 
the difficulty of obtaining class-wide adjudication of a claim, 
regardless of subtype. 
Moreover, plaintiffs must expend time and resources even on 
those appeals in which they ultimately succeed, further increasing the 
transaction costs associated with class treatment. The impact of these 
increased transaction costs should not be minimized, especially in the 
context of litigation seeking injunctive or declaratory relief for civil-
rights violations. Because this type of litigation usually consumes 
rather than generates resources on the plaintiffs’ side, even when the 
litigation succeeds in obtaining relief,195 even the strongest claims are 
unlikely to get to court without the involvement of nonprofit 
organizations, pro bono attorneys, or other charitable efforts.196 
Higher transaction costs further suppress the availability of 
representation for these types of class-action plaintiffs, and they limit 
the resources that organizations can commit to other activities when 
they do represent such plaintiffs on a class basis. 
 
 
 193. The data in this paragraph are based on my review of the 209 appeals decided pursuant 
to Rule 23(f) from its effective date through May 31, 2012, listed in Klonoff, supra note 8, at 
app. A. The appeals broke down as follows: 4.31 percent (nine appeals) involved the logical-
indivisibility subtype; 2.39 percent (five appeals) involved the limited-fund subtype; 29.19 
percent (sixty-one appeals) involved the injunctive civil-rights subtype; and 85.17 percent (178 
appeals) involved the aggregated-damages subtype. Id. These percentages do not add up to 100 
because of cases in which plaintiffs sought certification under more than one subtype. 
 194. As noted previously, only 9 of the 209 appeals involved the logical-indivisibility 
subtype, and only 5 involved the limited-fund subtype. See supra note 193. Considering only 
those two subtypes, defendants won reversal in two-thirds and 100 percent, respectively, of the 
cases in which the district court granted certification, while plaintiffs won reversal in none of the 
cases in which the district court denied certification. Id. 
 195. See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text.  
 196. See Kathryn A. Sabbeth, What’s Money Got to Do with It?: Public Interest Lawyering 
and Profit, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 441, 482–88 (2014) (explaining that “[c]ivil litigation is often an 
expensive proposition” requiring “ample financial resources”). 
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B. Evidentiary Burdens 
The class-action rule does not state the evidentiary burden 
required of plaintiffs seeking class treatment.197 Before 2000, many 
plaintiffs obtained certification on the basis of minimal evidence, or 
even mere allegations, that the proposed class met the requirements 
of Rule 23.198 In the early 2000s, however, courts began to increase the 
standard of proof required for class certification, regardless of 
subtype.199 
The heightened standards of proof flow largely from concerns 
about settlement pressure.200 Consider, for example, the Third 
Circuit’s influential decision in In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust 
Litigation.201 The court held that “[i]n deciding whether to certify a 
class under [Rule] 23, the district court must make whatever factual 
and legal inquiries are necessary and must consider all relevant 
evidence and arguments presented by the parties.”202 As articulated 
by the court, this standard requires judicial findings in support of each 
Rule 23 element, including factual determinations based on a 
preponderance of the evidence.203 The court decided that a more 
lenient standard would not suffice, largely because it viewed the 
certification decision as crucially important to both parties: 
Careful application of Rule 23 accords with the pivotal status of 
class certification in large-scale litigation, because “denying or 
granting class certification is often the defining moment in class 
actions (for it may sound the ‘death knell’ of the litigation on the 
 
 197. FED. R. CIV. P. 23; Bone, supra note 182, at 1112. 
 198. Bone, supra note 182, at 1111–12. 
 199. Id. In 2006 and 2008, the Second and Third Circuits issued influential opinions 
addressing the evidentiary showing required for class certification. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide 
Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008); In re Initial Pub. Offerings Secs. Litig., 471 F.3d 24 
(2d Cir. 2006). The two decisions “are examples of a trend in the circuits toward stricter 
evidentiary burdens.” RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, ROBERT G. BONE, ELIZABETH CHAMBLEE 
BURCH, CHARLES SILVER & PATRICK WOOLLEY, THE LAW OF CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER 
AGGREGATE LITIGATION 280 (2d ed. 2013). Both were influenced by the Seventh Circuit’s 
prior decision in Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc., 249 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 200. Bone, supra note 182, at 1110. For a discussion of the concerns that courts and 
commentators have raised about improper settlement pressure resulting from class certification, 
see supra Part II.A. 
 201. Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 305.  
 202. Id. at 307. 
 203. Id. 
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part of plaintiffs, or create unwarranted pressure to settle 
nonmeritorious claims on the part of defendants).”204 
Like other cases imposing strict evidentiary standards, this reasoning 
relies on the products of a debate limited to the context of the 
aggregated-damages class action.205 Yet its holding, and others like it, 
embrace all of the class-action subtypes in an undifferentiated 
manner.206 
Heightened evidentiary burdens increase the transaction costs 
associated with class treatment, as they require plaintiffs to introduce 
evidence supporting certification at an early stage in the 
proceedings,207 often without the benefits of full discovery.208 As to 
cases brought under subtypes other than the aggregated-damages 
class action, courts have not articulated a justification for those 
increased costs, which have a negative impact on the availability of 
the traditional subtypes. 
 
 204. Id. at 310 (quoting Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 
154, 162 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
 205. For a discussion on the scope of disputes over settlement pressure, see supra Part II.A 
(discussing the scope of disputes over settlement pressure); supra note 188 (discussing the scope 
of the “death knell” thesis). 
 206. See, e.g., Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 316 (referring to “the requirements of Rule 
23” rather than the requirements of a particular subtype); see also Brown v. Kelly, 609 F.3d 467, 
484–85 (2d Cir. 2010) (applying the predominance standard to both the aggregated-damages 
and the injunctive civil-rights subtypes). The Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart did not 
clarify the applicable evidentiary standard to the extent that some had hoped. See, e.g., Bone, 
supra note 134, at 116 (arguing that the Court should adopt a more principled standard, possibly 
differentiated by subtype, in its Wal-Mart decision). It did, however, make clear that class-action 
plaintiffs must present evidence, not just allegations, to demonstrate their compliance with Rule 
23. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). 
 207. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A) (requiring a court to decide the certification issue at 
“an early practicable time after a person sues or is sued as a class representative”). 
 208. In theory, courts should permit sufficient precertification discovery to allow the 
plaintiff an opportunity to make the required showing; but in practice, some impose circular 
constraints or strict limits on precertification discovery. See, e.g., Edwards v. First Am. Corp., 
385 Fed. App’x 629, 631 (9th Cir. 2010) (reversing the district court’s denial of precertification 
discovery, and permitting the plaintiff to bring a new motion for class certification after 
completion of that discovery); Tracy v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 303, 305 (D. 
Colo. 1998) (“Before classwide discovery is allowed, plaintiffs must demonstrate that ‘there is 
some factual basis for plaintiffs’ claims of classwide discrimination.’” (quoting Severtson v. 
Phillips Beverage Co., 137 F.R.D. 264, 267 (D. Minn. 1991))); see also 3 RUBENSTEIN, supra 
note 14, § 7:17 (“Courts . . . struggle to balance the fact that the certification decision overlaps 
with the merits with the idea that certification ought to be resolved before the merits, perhaps 
before full-on merits discovery.”); Malveaux, supra note 38, at 498 (“[T]he trajectory for [pre-
certification] discovery has been increasingly constrictive . . . . [E]mployers are now seeking to 
dismiss class claims on the face of the complaint pre-discovery, and some are prevailing.”). 
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C. Enumerated Ascertainability 
In 2003, five years after the adoption of Rule 23(f),209 another 
amendment to the class-action rule codified the requirement that 
“[a]n order that certifies a class action must define the class and the 
class claims, issues, or defenses.”210 This class-definition requirement 
had appeared in case law before the 2003 amendment, but at that 
point, few courts had denied certification on the basis of an 
inadequate definition.211 Courts have increasingly done so in the years 
following the amendment, often without giving plaintiffs an 
opportunity to amend the class definition to address the court’s 
concerns.212 
The Manual for Complex Litigation, published by the Federal 
Judicial Center for the benefit of federal trial judges, provides “some 
general guidance” as to the characteristics of an adequate class 
definition.213 It states that “[t]he definition must be precise, objective, 
and presently ascertainable,” but with regard to ascertainability, it 
notes that “Rule 23(b)(3) actions require a class definition that will 
permit identification of individual class members, while Rule 23(b)(1) 
or (b)(2) actions may not.”214 The latter part of this articulation of the 
ascertainability standard accords with the Advisory Committee’s 
statement, in its note to the 1966 revisions, that the injunctive civil-
rights subtype was intended to reach situations “where a party is 
charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class, usually one 
whose members are incapable of specific enumeration.”215 
 
 209. See supra Part II.A. 
 210. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B). 
 211. Klonoff, supra note 8, at 763–64. 
 212. Id. at 761–68. In addition to the possibility of giving plaintiffs the opportunity to change 
their class definition, courts have discretion to change the definition themselves, and many 
continue to do so rather than deny certification altogether. See generally Tobias Barrington 
Wolff, Discretion in Class Certification, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1897, 1918–26 (2014) (examining 
cases in which courts “alter[ed] the definition or scope of a plaintiff’s proposed class” instead of 
denying certification). 
 213. Klonoff, supra note 8, at 761 (noting that Rule 23 “does not elaborate on what 
constitutes an adequate class definition”). 
 214. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 21.222 (4th ed. 2004). 
 215. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (emphasis added). 
For an argument that this articulation is incorrect even as to the aggregated-damages subtype, 
see Geoffrey C. Shaw, Class Ascertainability, 124 YALE L.J. 2354, 2367 (2015); see also infra 
note 219 (showing that the language of Rule 23 recognizes that not all individuals in a class will 
be ascertainable).  
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As the Manual and the Advisory Committee note suggest, the 
function of the class definition varies depending on the particular 
subtype involved. In an aggregated-damages class action, for 
example, class members are entitled to notice of the action,216 an 
opportunity to opt out,217 and (usually) a personalized monetary 
award if the action succeeds.218 Unless the class definition enables the 
court and litigants to create an enumerated list of the members of the 
class, providing notice and distributing monetary awards might prove 
difficult.219 In contrast, an injunctive civil-rights class action does not 
require notice to class members220 or the distribution of individualized 
monetary relief.221 Instead of individual compensation, such an action 
focuses on changing the defendant’s conduct, which can be done 
without identifying each member of the class by name.222 Accordingly, 
“it is not clear that the implied requirement of definiteness [another 
 
 216. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (“For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court 
must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, 
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.”). 
 217. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v) (“The notice must clearly and concisely state . . . that the 
court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion.”). 
 218. But see Martin H. Redish, Peter Julian & Samantha Zyontz, Cy Pres Relief and the 
Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 
617, 620 (2010) (discussing “fluid recovery” and “cy pres” remedies, which “refer to efforts to 
provide the ‘next best’ form of relief in cases where it is impractical or impossible to directly 
compensate the injured class members”). 
 219. The class-action rule itself, however, appears to contemplate that some members of an 
aggregated-damages class will not be individually identifiable. Specifically, the notice provision 
states that “[f]or any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must direct to class members 
the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all 
members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (emphasis 
added). A requirement of enumerated ascertainability would render that final phrase 
superfluous. See Shaw, supra note 215, at 2367 (noting the tension between this language and 
the ascertainability requirement). 
 220. The class-action rule gives courts discretion as to whether notice must be provided in a 
particular case involving one of the traditional subtypes. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (“For any 
class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), the court may direct appropriate notice to the 
class.” (emphasis added)). 
 221. Indeed, the Supreme Court has explicitly held that a class action certified under the 
injunctive civil-rights subtype cannot include claims for individualized monetary relief. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557–61 (2011). 
 222. Under any subtype, the class definition facilitates class-wide preclusion, but the 
features of the class definition that are necessary to achieve that preclusion vary by subtype as 
well. In an injunctive civil-rights class action, for example, the definition need only describe the 
class in terms that will enable a later court to tell whether the plaintiff standing before it 
belonged to that class (and thus is now precluded from bringing his or her claim). Enabling this 
reverse-engineering does not require individual enumeration of class members at the time of the 
original class certification or judgment. 
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term for ascertainability] should apply to Rule 23(b)(2) class actions 
at all.”223 
Not all courts impose a strict “definiteness” or “ascertainability” 
requirement for class certification, and of those that do, some 
recognize that enumerated ascertainability (that is, the ability to 
identify each class member by name at the time of the class 
certification or judgment) should not be required under all 
subtypes.224 Recently, however, some courts have begun to apply a 
more exacting version of the ascertainability standard,225 even in cases 
involving the injunctive civil-rights subtype.226 This approach can have 
the illogical result that an inability to enumerate each person affected 
by a defendant’s policy or practice prevents the court from 
determining whether to enjoin the defendant from engaging in that 
policy or practice.227 Class-action law may thus be moving toward 
another undifferentiated restriction on the availability of class 
 
 223. 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 14, § 3:7. 
 224. Id.; see, e.g., Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 563 (3d Cir. 2015) (concluding that 
ascertainability is a requirement for certification of an aggregated-damages class action but not 
an injunctive civil-rights class action). The subtype-differentiated nature of the inquiry into the 
adequacy of the class definition has long been recognized: 
  This case brings into sharp focus the relationship between class actions under Rule 
23(b)(2), and class actions under Rule 23(b)(3). The provisions of Rule 23(b)(2) are 
designed to cover cases in which the primary concern is the grant of injunctive or 
declaratory relief. In such cases, there is no requirement that notice be given to all of 
the class members, and there is no opportunity for putative class members to “opt 
out.” Moreover, the precise definition of the class is relatively unimportant. If relief is 
granted to the plaintiff class, the defendants are legally obligated to comply, and it is 
usually unnecessary to define with precision the persons entitled to enforce 
compliance, since presumably at least the representative plaintiffs would be available 
to seek, and interested in obtaining, follow-up relief if necessary. 
  In a (b)(3) action, on the other hand, because of the notice and “opt out” features, 
greater precision in class definition is required. Moreover, most such actions involve 
claims for damages, and it is usually necessary, at some point, to identify individual 
members of the class. 
Rice v. City of Phila., 66 F.R.D. 17, 19 (E.D. Pa. 1974). 
 225. Klonoff, supra note 8, at 762 (“In recent years . . . a significant number of courts have 
utilized the requirement of an adequate class definition to deny class certification. In the last 
five years alone, dozens of cases have denied class certification because of a flawed definition 
(either solely on that ground or as one of alternative grounds).”); see also id.at 762 n.188 
(identifying dozens of cases in which courts have denied class certification by finding an 
inadequate class definition).  
 226. Id. at 764–65 (discussing Romberio v. UnumProvident Corp., 385 Fed. App’x 423 (6th 
Cir. 2009), involving the injunctive civil-rights subtype, and noting that “[t]he approach in 
Romberio is especially troublesome because courts are supposed to be less exacting in assessing 
class definitions in (b)(2) cases than in (b)(3) cases”); see also infra Part IV.A (discussing Jamie 
S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Schs., 668 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 2012), involving the injunctive civil-rights 
subtype). 
 227. For a detailed example of this effect, see infra Part IV.A. 
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treatment, one that not only increases the transaction costs associated 
with class certification, but that also can defeat certification 
altogether. 
D. Class Waivers 
Beginning in 2010, in a series of decisions interpreting the 
Federal Arbitration Act, the U.S. Supreme Court has dramatically 
expanded defendants’ ability to avoid class treatment through the use 
of contractual waivers.228 Taken together, these cases establish that a 
preexisting contract between the plaintiff and defendant can preclude 
class treatment, both in federal court and within the arbitral forum, if 
it contains an arbitration clause that either prohibits the aggregation 
of claims229 or is silent on the issue.230 In the view of some scholars, 
“[a]ll of the doctrinal developments of recent years circumscribing the 
reach of class actions pale in import” next to these decisions, which 
permit companies to “opt out of potential liability by incorporating 
class action waiver language in their standard form contracts with 
consumers (or employees or others).”231 
The rationales for these class-waiver holdings reflect the limited 
scope of the class-action debate. The Court has asserted that class 
proceedings take too long and cost too much to be used in 
arbitration,232 reflecting the limited terms of disputes over expense 
and delay.233 The Court has also stated that “class arbitration greatly 
increases risks to defendants,” and that “[a]rbitration is poorly suited 
to the higher stakes of class litigation,”234 reflecting the limited terms 
of disputes over settlement pressure.235 Moreover, in the most recent 
of these cases, the Court provided a justification for precluding the 
creation of economically viable claims under the aggregated-damages 
 
 228. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013); AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750–51 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1774 (2010). 
 229. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1752–53. 
 230. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1771. If the arbitrator finds that the parties’ contract provides 
for class arbitration, however, a court will not reverse that finding. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. 
Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2070 (2013). 
 231. Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of 
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 627 (2012). 
 232. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775. 
 233. See supra Part II.C. 
 234. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1752 
 235. See supra Part II.A. 
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subtype.236 Yet the Court has failed to acknowledge or justify the 
simultaneous constriction of the other subtypes, even as it has 
announced these new interpretations of the Federal Arbitration Act 
that apply across the board in permitting defendants to contract their 
way out of class treatment.237 
The impact of the Court’s recent class-waiver decisions on the 
injunctive civil-rights class action is especially troubling. Consider, for 
example, employment-discrimination class actions seeking injunctive 
relief against an employer’s generally applicable policy or practice. 
Such actions could ultimately disappear from the courts altogether, 
because “[a]t the time of hiring—or, indeed, at any time thereafter—
businesses can (and often do) ask their employees to sign contractual 
agreements, including clauses to arbitrate any dispute that might 
arise.”238 It is reasonable to think that most—if not all—businesses will 
eventually choose to adopt employment contracts with nonclass 
arbitration clauses, and thereby prevent employment-related class 
actions from being brought against them.239 
Courts and lawmakers have long recognized that cases seeking 
broad injunctive relief can offer public as well as private benefits. 
Indeed, Congress has enacted a range of fee-shifting statutes to 
encourage litigants to secure those public benefits, and the Supreme 
Court has recognized that when a fee-shifting plaintiff “obtains an 
injunction, he does so not for himself alone but also as a ‘private 
attorney general,’ vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the 
highest priority.”240 Permitting defendants to avoid class actions 
seeking this type of injunctive relief limits the efficacy of the would-
 
 236. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013). 
 237. Previously, for example, California law did not allow a defendant to compel arbitration 
of certain claims seeking broad injunctions that would benefit the public. See Cruz v. PacifiCare 
Health Sys., Inc., 66 P.3d 1157, 1165 (Cal. 2003); Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of Cal., 988 
P.2d 67, 73–74 (Cal. 1999). In light of Concepcion and the other arbitration cases discussed 
above, however, those claims are now subject to mandatory arbitration. See Ferguson v. 
Corinthian Colls., Inc., 733 F.3d 928, 933–34 (9th Cir. 2013) (recognizing the abrogation of 
Broughton and Cruz); Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, Inc., 144 Cal. Rptr. 3d 198, 214–15 
(Cal. App. 2012), as modified on denial of reh’g (Aug. 14, 2012). 
 238. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Class Actions?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 161, 176 (2015). 
 239. Id. 
 240. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 401–02 (1968). This is not to say that a 
remedial system offering only injunctive relief is without problems. See generally Samuel R. 
Bagenstos, The Perversity of Limited Civil Rights Remedies: The Case of “Abusive” ADA 
Litigation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2006) (arguing that a remedial system offering only injunctive 
relief reduces the amount of cases brought and encourages conduct that defendants view as 
abusive). 
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be private attorney general by consigning him to the arbitral forum—
or, potentially, dissuading him from seeking enforcement at all. 
E. Heightened Commonality 
In its 2011 decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the U.S. 
Supreme Court introduced yet another undifferentiated restriction on 
the availability of class treatment. The decision imposed a much 
stricter version of the commonality requirement—one of the four 
prerequisites that all class actions must satisfy241—than courts had 
previously applied.242 Notwithstanding the language of the rule, which 
requires only that there be “questions of law or fact common to the 
class,”243 the Court rejected the proposition that the identification of 
common questions should suffice to establish commonality.244 Instead, 
the Court held that all class members must “have suffered the same 
injury,”245 that “[t]heir claims must depend upon a common 
contention” that is “central to the validity of each one of the claims,” 
and that resolution of the common contention must resolve a central 
issue “in one stroke.”246 This inquiry requires a focus on dissimilarities 
within the proposed class, the Court explained, because those 
dissimilarities “have the potential to impede the generation of 
common answers” to the common questions that the class purports to 
present.247 
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg objected that the Court had 
imported into the commonality requirement, which applies to all 
class-action subtypes, the more stringent “predominance” and 
“superiority” standards that apply only to the aggregated-damages 
class action. Specifically, Justice Ginsburg argued that248 
 
 241. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 242. A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining Access to 
Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441, 463 (2013). 
 243. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). 
 244. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). 
 245. Id. (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)). 
 246. Id.; see also Spencer, supra note 242, at 464 (referring to these three requirements as 
“the same injury, centrality, and efficiency requirements”). 
 247. Id. (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)). 
 248. Id. at 2565–66 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (allowing 
certification of an aggregated-damages class action only if “the court finds that the questions of 
law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members [predominance], and that a class action is superior to other available methods for 
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy [superiority]”). 
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[t]he Court’s emphasis on differences between class members 
mimics the Rule 23(b)(3) inquiry into whether common questions 
“predominate” over individual issues. And by asking whether the 
individual differences “impede” common adjudication, the Court 
duplicates 23(b)(3)’s question whether “a class action is superior” to 
other modes of adjudication. . . . If courts must conduct a 
“dissimilarities” analysis at the Rule 23(a)(2) [commonality] stage, 
no mission remains for Rule 23(b)(3).249 
The dissent noted that the Court’s directive to focus on dissimilarities 
as part of the commonality analysis was “far reaching” because of its 
effects on subtypes other than the aggregated-damages class action: 
“Individual differences should not bar a Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 
23(b)(2) class, so long as the Rule 23(a) threshold is met.”250 
The Wal-Mart commonality holding251 appears to arise from a 
somewhat different source than the other products of myopia 
discussed above. The Court did not explicitly articulate the concerns 
that motivated its ratcheting-up of the commonality requirement, 
creating ambiguity as to whether it analyzed those concerns only 
within the limited context of the aggregated-damages subtype.252 
Moreover, another part of the opinion explicitly discussed (and 
strengthened) the distinctions between the traditional subtypes and 
the aggregated-damages class action, making clear that the Court had 
the existence of those subtypes firmly in mind.253 
 
 249. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2566 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation and quotation marks 
omitted). 
 250. Id. The majority responded, “We consider dissimilarities not in order to determine (as 
Rule 23(b)(3) [the aggregated-damages subtype] requires) whether common questions 
predominate, but in order to determine (as Rule 23(a)(2) [the commonality prerequisite] 
requires) whether there is even a single common question.” Id. at 2556 (majority opinion) 
(alterations omitted) (emphases omitted) (quotation marks omitted). 
 251. For an argument that “the Court’s holding does not speak primarily to the content of 
Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement,” but instead “sounds in the liability policies of Title 
VII,” see Tobias Barrington Wolff, Managerial Judging and Substantive Law, 90 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1027, 1038 (2013). 
 252. Cf. Bone, supra note 181, at 699 (“The Court’s rationale for this stricter rule [i.e. the 
commonality holding in Wal-Mart] is not terribly clear.”). 
 253. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557–61 (holding that claims for individualized monetary relief 
cannot be brought pursuant to the injunctive civil-rights subtype). As Elizabeth Porter has 
noted, these two portions of the Wal-Mart opinion demonstrate dramatic differences in tone and 
interpretive approach, to the point that they almost seem like they could have been written by 
different justices. See Elizabeth G. Porter, Pragmatism Rules, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 123, 128 
(2015). 
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The features of the opinion described in the previous paragraph 
suggest that the Court may not have fallen prey to the same form of 
myopia that led to the other undifferentiated changes discussed in this 
Part. The across-the-board nature of those changes resulted from 
what might be termed a “concern-based” form of myopia, in which 
concerns about the aggregated-damages class action are permitted to 
spill over onto and restrict the availability of the other subtypes. That 
is, it does not appear that the Court imposed its across-the-board 
change in the commonality requirement based on a specific concern 
that applies only in the limited context of the aggregated-damages 
class action. 
Although the Wal-Mart commonality holding does not appear to 
represent a concern-based form of myopia, it does appear to 
represent a claim-based form of myopia, in which undue attention to 
the monetary relief sought by the class renders invisible the injunctive 
or declaratory relief being sought simultaneously. The plaintiffs’ 
stated purpose in the Wal-Mart litigation was to obtain a class-wide 
injunction restructuring the defendant’s employment practices, so as 
to counteract the gender bias that (according to plaintiffs) pervaded 
the company’s operations. The part of the opinion addressing 
commonality ignored that stated purpose entirely. Instead, consistent 
with a myopic focus on aggregated-damages claims, the Court focused 
exclusively on the monetary relief the plaintiffs sought for individual 
class members: it identified the “crucial question” in the litigation as 
“why was I disfavored”254 (that is, are individual class members 
entitled to monetary relief) rather than “are the defendant’s 
company-wide employment practices unlawful”255 (that is, is a class-
wide injunction warranted). 
The Court reached its conclusion about the “crucial question” in 
the case after citing to Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond256 
for the proposition that “in resolving an individual’s Title VII claim, 
the crux of the inquiry is ‘the reason for a particular employment 
decision.’”257 This choice of authority is odd, to say the least. Cooper 
emphasized the “manifest” differences between a Title VII class 
 
 254. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2552.  
 255. See id. at 2565 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court gives no credence to the key 
dispute common to the class: whether Wal-Mart’s discretionary pay and promotion policies are 
discriminatory.”).  
 256. Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 876 (1984). 
 257. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2552. 
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action challenging a general pattern and practice of discrimination 
(like Wal-Mart) and a Title VII claim involving an individual.258 The 
Cooper Court stated that “[t]he inquiry regarding an individual’s 
claim is the reason for a particular employment decision, while at the 
liability stage of a pattern-or-practice trial the focus often will not be 
on individual hiring decisions, but on a pattern of discriminatory 
decisionmaking.”259 The Wal-Mart Court’s reasoning and choice of 
authority makes sense only if one views the case narrowly (indeed, 
myopically) as a collection of individual damages claims, overlooking 
that the plaintiffs requested class-wide injunctive relief. 
To be clear, the problem with the across-the-board reach of the 
Wal-Mart commonality holding is not that commonality should mean 
something different for each subtype. Rather, the problem is that, 
because different subtypes involve different types of claims and 
different forms of relief, there are some functions that the 
commonality requirement—which applies to all of the subtypes, 
unlike, for example, the predominance requirement260—should not 
perform. As with enumerated ascertainability,261 overextending 
commonality can prevent the class-wide adjudication of claims, 
thereby preventing the traditional subtypes from performing their 
intended functions. 
The decision in Wal-Mart is widely recognized as a sea change in 
class-action law, though as the foregoing discussion demonstrates, 
class-action plaintiffs did not find themselves in friendly seas even 
before that opinion issued. Over the past several years, an 
“unambitious and unflattering vision of class actions . . . has become 
the regnant view among legislative and judicial policymakers.”262 That 
vision has caused significant changes to the law governing all class-
action subtypes, but it arises from a debate focused almost entirely on 
the aggregated-damages class action. 
 
 258. Cooper, 467 U.S. at 876. 
 259. Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
 260. See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2566 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 261. See supra Part III.C. 
 262. Tidmarsh, supra note 1, at 698. Though not discussed in the text, the Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2005 both responded and contributed to this negative view of class actions; the 
statute expanded federal jurisdiction over class actions, but its impact reaches beyond the 
doctrinal changes it introduced. See id.; see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness 
Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1530 (2008) 
(“[S]ome of CAFA’s supporters were not seeking different class action law so much as they 
were seeking different attitudes towards class certification.”). 
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IV.  CASE STUDIES OF THE HARM TO COURTS AND LITIGANTS 
Concerns arising from the limited context of the aggregated-
damages class action263 have constrained the availability of the class-
action device as a whole, including the logical-indivisibility,264 limited-
fund,265 and injunctive civil-rights266 subtypes. This constriction 
implicates a deep historical irony. The least controversial class 
forms—the ones that had already achieved widespread acceptance as 
situations demanding class treatment at the time of the 1966 
revisions—have been eclipsed by the form that the designers of the 
modern framework were not even sure whether to include.267 Worries 
about the “‘adventuresome’ innovation”268 represented by the 
aggregated-damages class action have thereby lessened the 
availability of the subtypes that have long been viewed as 
institutionally beneficial.269 This Part aims to illustrate the harms 
caused by that lessened availability through case studies of recent 
actions in which the plaintiffs relied on the injunctive civil-rights class 
action, or in which they could have done so, but chose not to. 
A. Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Public Schools 
For some civil-rights claims, the recent constraints on class 
treatment have effectively prevented any adjudication of the factual 
and legal issues presented, whether in favor of the plaintiffs or the 
defendants.270 For example, consider Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Public 
Schools,271 a case decided by the Seventh Circuit in 2012. In Jamie S., 
the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of a 
putative class of special-education students, alleging that defendants 
Milwaukee Public Schools and Wisconsin Department of Instruction 
 
 263. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 264. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A). 
 265. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B). 
 266. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
 267. See supra Part I. 
 268. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997) (citation omitted). 
 269. See supra Part III (discussing across-the-board restrictions on the class-action device 
imposed in response to concerns largely rooted in the aggregated-damages subtype). 
 270. Cf. Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 680 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that in the absence of 
class treatment, Eighth Amendment violations allegedly caused by the under-resourcing of a 
prison system would likely go unaddressed); Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 
2014) (en banc) (holding that, in a nonclass damages suit against prison officials, under-
resourcing can excuse what would otherwise constitute an Eighth Amendment violation). 
 271. Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Schs., 668 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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had violated their rights under the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (IDEA).272 Specifically, the IDEA requires 
participating states to implement a process known as “child find,” 
under which all children with disabilities who are “residing in the 
State . . . and who are in need of special education and related 
services, are identified, located, and evaluated.”273 The Jamie S. 
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had failed to satisfy the child-
find requirements, resulting in students with disabilities being denied 
or delayed access to special-education services.274 
The district court granted certification, under the injunctive civil-
rights subtype, for a class defined as follows: 
Those students eligible for special education services from the 
Milwaukee Public School System who are, have been or will be 
either denied or delayed entry or participation in the processes 
which result in a properly constituted meeting between the IEP 
team and the parents or guardians of the student.275 
The court subsequently found the defendants liable for violating the 
child-find requirements.276 It ordered the defendant school district277 to 
implement a complex remedial scheme, under which the parents or 
guardians of potential class members would receive notice and an 
opportunity for an evaluation of their child’s special-education 
needs.278 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit vacated the remedial order and 
decertified the class, holding that the proposed class failed on grounds 
of ascertainability,279 commonality,280 and indivisibility.281 As to 
 
 272. Id. at 484–86. The plaintiffs were represented by attorneys from Disability Rights 
Wisconsin, a nonprofit advocacy group. Id. at 484. 
 273. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A) (2012). 
 274. Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 485. The plaintiffs had initially pleaded a broader set of 
allegations, but by the time of the appellate court’s decision, the scope of the case had been 
narrowed. Id. 
 275. Id. at 487–88. An IEP, or Individualized Education Plan, outlines the specific 
educational services to which a child is statutorily entitled. Those services are identified and 
memorialized at a meeting attended by the members of the child’s “IEP team,” including his or 
her parent or guardian. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(4)–(5), 1414(d)(1)(B) (2012)). 
 276. Id. at 488. 
 277. The defendant state agency had settled with the plaintiffs after the liability phase 
ended. Id. 
 278. Id. at 489. 
 279. Id. at 485. Ascertainability, a term that does not appear in the class-action rule, refers 
to a court’s ability to identify the members of the class. For a discussion of the impact of myopia 
on the ascertainability requirement, see supra Part III.C. 
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ascertainability, the court held that “this class lacks the definiteness 
required for class certification; there is no way to know or readily 
ascertain who is a member of the class.”282 It then held commonality 
to be lacking because “resolving any individual class member’s claim 
for relief under the IDEA requires an inherently particularized 
inquiry into the circumstances of the child’s case.”283 Finally, it held 
that the class did not seek an appropriately class-wide remedy 
because “as a substantive matter the relief sought would merely 
initiate a process through which highly individualized determinations 
of liability and remedy are made; this kind of relief would be class-
wide in name only.”284 
It is profoundly unlikely that any of the reasons articulated in 
Jamie S. would have prevented certification under the injunctive civil-
rights class action as it was understood in 1966. Consider a 
paradigmatic desegregation case during the time of pupil-assignment 
laws, which allowed school boards to conduct an individualized, 
multiple-factor assessment of each student’s appropriate school 
placement.285 Even though the process as a whole resulted in 
segregated schools, there was no way to know what the outcome of 
the individualized inquiry for any particular African American 
student would have been if the process had been conducted fairly. 
Under the logic of Jamie S., the class of students denied equal 
treatment would thus be unascertainable on the basis that “there is no 
way to know or readily ascertain who is a member of the class.”286 
Similarly, because resolving any particular class member’s claim for 
 
 280. Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 485–86. Commonality refers to the requirement, set forth in Rule 
23(a)(2), that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). 
For a discussion of the impact of myopia on the commonality requirement, see supra Part III.E. 
 281. Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 485–86. Indivisibility, another term that does not appear in the 
class-action rule, has resisted a straightforward definition. See infra Part V.C. In Wal-Mart, the 
Court explained indivisibility as “the notion that the conduct [challenged by the class] is such 
that it can be enjoined or declared unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none of 
them.’” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011) (quoting Nagareda, supra 
note 247, at 132). 
 282. Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 495. The Seventh Circuit recently declined to adopt an 
ascertainability standard for aggregated-damages class actions as strict as the one that other 
courts have applied. See Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2015). In that 
opinion, however, the Seventh Circuit referred to Jamie S. as an example of an acceptably 
“weak” ascertainability requirement applicable to all subtypes. Id. at 659. 
 283. Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 498. 
 284. Id. at 499. 
 285. See supra Part I.A.3. 
 286. Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 495. 
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admission to the all-white school would “require[] an inherently 
particularized inquiry into the circumstances of the child’s case,”287 the 
class would also lack commonality. Finally, because reassigning 
students on a nonsegregated basis would “merely initiate a process 
through which highly individualized determinations of liability and 
remedy are made,”288 the remedy would not be deemed appropriate 
under Rule 23(b)(2). Yet this was precisely the type of case for which 
the injunctive civil-rights class action was designed.289 
The Jamie S. opinion contains some suggestions that the court’s 
real objection was not to the appropriateness of class treatment, but 
to the cost and intrusiveness of the proposed remedy. The court noted 
that the district court’s order “required [the defendant] to create a 
massive identification and evaluation system consuming significant 
educational resources and costing millions of dollars.”290 It also 
dismissed a precedent upon which the plaintiffs had relied as “a relic 
of a time when the federal judiciary thought that structural 
injunctions taking control of executive functions were sensible.”291 
The increasing restrictions on class treatment enable courts to 
transform objections like these into barriers to certification. 
If the burdensomeness of the remedy is the problem, however, 
class certification is not the appropriate point at which to address it.292 
Indeed, the certification stage often will not even be an effective point 
 
 287. Id. at 498. 
 288. Id. at 499. 
 289. This is not to say that these types of cases should automatically be certified without 
procedural protections, such as class-wide notice and subclassing, that the authors of the 1966 
revisions would have deemed unnecessary. Indeed, insights gained in the years since the 
adoption of the modern class-action rule suggest a need for more thorough analysis of intraclass 
conflicts in injunctive civil-rights class actions than those authors likely had in mind. See, e.g., 
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School 
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 471 (1976). Denying certification altogether, 
however, cannot generally offer an effective response to such conflicts, as it “would often 
introduce all the inefficiencies attending individual suits, without necessarily restricting the 
scope of the ultimate decree.” Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. 
REV. 1183, 1195 (1982); see also infra Part IV.A (arguing that, before limiting class treatment in 
response to a concern about the class-action device, courts and policymakers should determine 
whether the denial of class treatment will effectively address that concern). 
 290. Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 491. 
 291. Id. at 496 (quoting Rahman v. Chertoff, 530 F.3d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 2008)). 
 292. Cf. Marcus, Public Interest, supra note 38, at 21 (noting that “no one has developed . . . 
to any extent” the idea that “class action procedure is the right lever to pull” to rein in structural 
reform litigation); Wolff, supra note 251, at 1042 (arguing, in the context of statutory-damages 
actions, that “Rule 23 does not set policy on the propriety of aggregate remedies as a means of 
accomplishing regulatory goals”). 
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at which to address that problem, as many courts will issue structural 
injunctions or other potentially burdensome remedies in the absence 
of class treatment.293 Moreover, denying class certification leaves 
defendants without the benefit of class-wide preclusion. They remain 
subject to suit on the identical issue, and there is no preclusive barrier 
to a subsequent suit proceeding in class form.294 At the same time, the 
absence of class treatment can leave plaintiffs without a meaningful 
remedy, no matter how egregious or widespread the violation. For 
example, those affected may be unaware that their rights have been 
violated, or they may lack the resources to bring individual lawsuits in 
numbers sufficient to justify systemic relief.295 It would be far better to 
resolve the factual and legal issues as to the class as a whole—whether 
in favor of the plaintiffs or the defendants—and if the plaintiffs 
prevailed, to apply remedial principles to determine the appropriate 
scope of the remedy.296 
 
 293. To the contrary, courts sometimes deny a plaintiff’s request for class certification on 
the ground that the court will issue as broad a remedy to the individual plaintiff as it would to a 
plaintiff class, making class treatment unnecessary. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. 
MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, 7AA FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1785.2 (3d ed. 
2005 & Supp. 2015). For criticism of this “necessity” doctrine, see Carroll, supra note 28, at 
2077–78.  
 294. This is because, as the Supreme Court recently made clear, “[n]either a proposed class 
action nor a rejected class action may bind nonparties.” Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 
2380 (2011). The Court acknowledged that “the rule against nonparty preclusion . . . perforce 
leads to relitigation of many issues, as plaintiff after plaintiff after plaintiff (none precluded by 
the last judgment because none a party to the last suit) tries his hand at establishing some legal 
principle or obtaining some grant of relief.” Id. at 2381. 
 295. Writing separately in Jamie S., Judge Rovner expressed concerns along these lines. See 
Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 505 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). She argued that: 
[The absence of class treatment] would surely mean that many such students would 
remain unidentified and denied their right to free appropriate public education (if 
only because they would be unaware of their rights) and likely would mean that the 
systemic violation underlying their claims to relief would persist, as any individual 
proceedings would result in individual rather than structural relief. 
Id. Similarly, in a case involving unlawful strip searches, the Second Circuit determined that  
[a]bsent class certification and its attendant class-wide notice procedures, most of 
these individuals—who potentially number in the thousands—likely never will know 
that defendants violated their clearly established constitutional rights, and thus never 
will be able to vindicate those rights. As a practical matter, then, without use of the 
class action mechanism, individuals harmed by defendants’ policy and practice may 
lack an effective remedy altogether. 
In re Nassau Cty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 229 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 296. See, e.g., Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979) (“[I]njunctive relief should be 
no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the 
plaintiffs.”). 
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B. M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry 
The recent restrictions on class treatment, coupled with the 
instability of the doctrine, have led to significant and unproductive 
delays in the resolution of class actions brought under the traditional 
subtypes. M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry,297 a case decided by the 
Fifth Circuit in 2012, provides an example of this phenomenon. The 
plaintiffs in M.D. alleged that understaffing and general under-
resourcing of the Texas foster-care system exposed the state’s 12,000 
foster children to an unreasonable risk of harm, in violation of the 
children’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.298 The plaintiffs filed their 
complaint in March 2011, and they moved for class certification less 
than a week later; the district court granted certification less than two 
months after that, and soon set a trial date for February 2013.299 The 
case appeared to be moving relatively expeditiously toward a merits 
resolution. 
An interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 23(f), however, sent 
the case back to the certification stage.300 In its March 2012 decision in 
that appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that the Supreme Court’s 
intervening decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes required it to 
vacate the district court’s class certification order.301 First, the Fifth 
Circuit held that the lower court had failed to conduct the “rigorous 
analysis” that Wal-Mart required as to commonality.302 Next, the 
appellate court held that the proposed class failed to meet the 
requirements of the injunctive civil-rights subtype, because the 
plaintiffs had not shown that a single injunction could provide relief 
to the entire class.303 The court noted that if the plaintiffs attempted to 
 
 297. M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 298. Id. at 835. 
 299. See M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 294 F.R.D. 7, 18 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (describing this 
timeline). 
 300. See M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg, 675 F.3d at 836 (describing this procedure). 
 301. Id. at 839 (“Although the district court’s analysis may have been a reasonable 
application of pre–Wal-Mart precedent, the Wal-Mart decision has heightened the standards for 
establishing commonality under Rule 23(a)(2), rendering the district court’s analysis 
insufficient.”); see also id. at 848 n.8 (“We acknowledge that [Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 
372, 377 (2d Cir. 1997) (per curiam),] found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by 
certifying a similar class action. But the court did acknowledge that the proposed class 
‘stretche[d] the notions of commonality and typicality,’ . . . and it was decided before the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Wal-Mart.” (citation omitted)). 
 302. Id. at 838. 
 303. Id. As with Jamie S., aspects of the opinion suggest that the court’s real concern was 
with the burdensomeness of the proposed remedy, rather than the fitness of the claims for class 
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cure these deficiencies by creating subclasses, each corresponding to a 
discrete legal claim and a commensurate request for relief, the district 
court would need to perform the required “rigorous analysis” as to 
each subclass.304 
After engaging in additional discovery, the plaintiffs filed a new 
motion for class certification several months later, and the district 
court held a three-day hearing on the motion in January 2013. In 
support of their respective positions for and against certification, the 
parties presented extensive evidence, including expert testimony and 
reports, live and written testimony from individuals involved in the 
Texas foster-care system, and the foster-care agency’s internal 
documents.305 Several more months passed before the district court 
again granted class certification, announcing its decision in a sixty-
one-page order.306 In addition to the more extensive evidence 
considered and the more detailed analysis conducted (as compared to 
the certification order issued seventeen months earlier), the new 
order set forth a number of subclasses in addition to the original, 
general class of Texas foster children.307 The purpose of this 
subclassing was not to address actual or potential conflicts within the 
class, but to match the scope of each subclass with the scope of each 
discrete claim and potential remedy, in accordance with the Fifth 
Circuit’s directive.308 
Defendants again attempted to appeal the class-certification 
order under Rule 23(f), but they missed the filing deadline, causing 
the Fifth Circuit to reject the effort.309 A bench trial on the merits of 
the plaintiff’s claims took place in December 2014. The issues 
addressed at that trial—for example, “whether [the challenged] 
 
treatment. See id. at 841 n.3 (“[I]t is not the role of courts, but that of the political branches, to 
shape the institutions of government in such fashion as to comply with the laws and the 
Constitution.” (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349–50 (1996))); id. at 845 (“The proposed 
class seeks at least twelve broad, classwide injunctions, which would require the district court to 
institute and oversee a complete overhaul of Texas’s foster care system.”). 
 304. Id. at 848. 
 305. M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 294 F.R.D. 7, 36–38 (S.D. Tex. 2013). 
 306. The plaintiffs’ motion was denied in part; one of the proposed subclasses could not be 
certified because its representatives had left the foster system during the lengthy certification 
dispute. Id. at 62–63. The district court permitted the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to 
include substituted representatives for that subclass, and authorized discovery as to those newly 
named representatives. Id. at 63–65. 
 307. Id. at 30–31. 
 308. Id. at 56, 59, 61–62 (identifying potential remedies corresponding to each subclass). 
 309. M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 547 F. App’x 543, 544 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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policies subject class members to an unreasonable risk of harm, and 
whether that risk is so unreasonable as to rise to a constitutional 
violation”310—were essentially the same as they would have been in 
February 2013. 
The trial court recently decided the case in the children’s favor.311 
Its opinion emphasized the harms that the children have experienced 
over a period of many years: 
[The Texas Department of Family Services (“DFPS”)] has ignored 
20 years of reports, outlining problems and recommending solutions. 
DFPS has also ignored professional standards. All the while, Texas’s 
[long-term foster-care] children have been shuttled throughout a 
system where rape, abuse, psychotropic medication, and instability 
are the norm.312 
The court found that these harms have continued during the time the 
lawsuit has been pending.313 
The delay in M.D. flowed directly from the across-the-board 
changes that the current class-action debate has produced. The 
defendants were able to appeal because of the adoption of Rule 
23(f),314 the appellate court deemed the district court’s analysis 
insufficient because of newly heightened evidentiary and 
commonality requirements,315 and the appellate decision was itself 
delayed by the need to await and respond to the doctrinal changes 
introduced by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.316 Yet it is unclear what 
values, if any, have been served by the more formalistic but 
substantively equivalent analysis that resulted. Nothing about the 
history of this case demonstrates any clear benefit with regard to 
settlement pressure, attorney overcompensation, delay and expense, 
 
 310. M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg, 294 F.R.D. at 45. 
 311. M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, No. 2:11-cv-00084 (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.
childrensrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/2015-12-17-Memo-opinion-and-verdict-of-the-
court-2.pdf [http://perma.cc/B28L-EXTR]. 
 312. Id. at 255. 
 313. The court rejected the defendants’ assertions that they had made meaningful 
improvements to the foster-care system, stating that “[o]f the two reforms to which DFPS 
pointed . . . one was instituted in the wake of this lawsuit, the other is an abject failure, and 
neither answers any of Plaintiffs’ claims.” Id. 
 314. See supra Part III.A. 
 315. See supra Part III.B, III.E. 
 316. See supra note 301. 
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or any other topic embraced by the current class-action debate.317 
Indeed, as to delay and expense, there has been a clear detriment. 
This increase in delay and expense implicates the concerns about 
transaction costs discussed previously. That is, increases in the 
transaction costs of injunctive civil-rights class actions have the effect 
of further suppressing a type of litigation that is already suppressed 
by market forces.318 Concerns about transaction costs may have 
particular relevance to the M.D. litigation—the plaintiffs, like 
plaintiffs in many class actions seeking only injunctive or declaratory 
relief, were represented by a nonprofit legal organization.319 
C. Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin 
As the foregoing discussion of delay would suggest, the recent 
restrictions on class treatment create structural disincentives for 
plaintiffs to use the class-action device. Those disincentives have 
particular relevance in cases seeking purely injunctive or declaratory 
relief against a defendant’s generally applicable policy or practice, 
because a plaintiff bringing such a claim must decide whether to 
pursue class treatment or whether to instead bring the claim on a 
formally individual basis.320 
As I have argued elsewhere, difficult problems can arise when a 
plaintiff chooses to challenge a defendant’s generally applicable 
policy or practice on a nonclass basis.321 For example, consider the 
lengthy and ongoing litigation in Fisher v. University of Texas at 
Austin.322 The plaintiff brought the lawsuit only on her own behalf,323 
 
 317. See supra Part II. 
 318. See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the particular 
sources of increased transaction costs in injunctive civil-rights class actions, see supra Part 
III.A–C. 
 319. Three law firms, working on a pro bono basis, joined nonprofit Children’s Rights, Inc. 
in representing the plaintiffs. See Press Release, Children’s Rights, Inc., National Advocates and 
Texas Attorneys File Federal Class Action Seeking Reform of Texas Child Welfare System 
(Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.childrensrights.org/press-release/national-advocates-and-texas-
attorneys-file-federal-class-action-seeking-reform-of-texas-child-welfare-system [http://perma.
cc/YG5F-25ZS] (identifying Children’s Rights, Inc., Haynes and Boone, Yetter Coleman, and 
Canales & Simonson as plaintiffs’ counsel).  
 320. See Carroll, supra note 28, at 2024–27. Depending on the nature of the plaintiff’s claim 
and the defendant’s conduct, class treatment may be available under the injunctive civil-rights 
subtype, the logical-indivisibility subtype, or both. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
 323. Shortly after the filing of the original complaint, a second individual plaintiff joined the 
lawsuit, but that plaintiff is no longer involved in the litigation. See Second Amended Complaint 
CARROLL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/22/2016  9:43 PM 
2016] CLASS ACTION MYOPIA 899 
but sought to stop the defendant from making race-conscious 
admissions decisions with regard to all applicants to its undergraduate 
program.324 If the defendant ultimately prevails on the merits, its 
victory will have preclusive effect only with regard to the individual 
plaintiff. Accordingly, as a matter of preclusion, the university will 
remain subject to further litigation on the identical issues decided in 
its favor.325 Under the original posture of the case, however, a win for 
the plaintiff could have resulted in a sweeping order restructuring the 
defendant’s admissions program.326 These potential outcomes created 
 
for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Other Relief at ¶ 1, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. 
Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (No.A-08-CA-263-SS), 2008 WL 7318510 (identifying the 
additional plaintiff). 
 324. Id. (seeking “to preliminarily and permanently enjoin [the defendants] from employing 
racially discriminatory policies and procedures in administering the undergraduate admissions 
program at the University of Texas at Austin”).  
 325. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893 (2008) (holding that, apart from class actions 
and other limited exceptions, “one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in 
which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of 
process” (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940))); see also Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 
S. Ct. 2368, 2381 (2011) (“[T]he rule against nonparty preclusion . . . perforce leads to 
relitigation of many issues . . . .”). As a matter of precedent, there may be a bar to relitigation of 
legal issues decided in the initial case. The existence of such a bar will depend on numerous 
factors, including the original plaintiff’s decision whether to appeal and the appellate court’s 
decision whether to issue an “unpublished” (nonprecedential) decision. See Carroll, supra note 
28, at 2052 & n.202. 
 326. The plaintiff initially had standing to seek forward-looking relief only because the 
Supreme Court has defined the injury to plaintiffs challenging affirmative-action plans as the 
“inability to compete on an equal footing” with members of the group that the affirmative 
action plan aims to benefit. See Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. 
City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993). This definition of a constitutionally cognizable 
injury is in tension with the Court’s standing jurisprudence outside of the affirmative-action 
context, and it has garnered a great deal of criticism. See, e.g., Vikram David Amar, Is Honesty 
the Best (Judicial) Policy in Affirmative Action Cases? Fisher v. University of Texas Gives the 
Court (Yet) Another Chance to Say Yes, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 77, 78 (2012) (noting that 
“procedural requirements concerning the Court’s ability to adjudicate the merits of disputes 
have played out with particular incoherence, if not result-orientation, in affirmative action 
lawsuits”); Maureen Carroll, Racialized Assumptions and Constitutional Harm: Claims of Injury 
Based on Public School Assignment, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 903, 919–21 (2011) (discussing the 
tensions between standing decisions in affirmative-action cases and other school-assignment 
cases); Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimination, 
Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73, 81 (2010) (arguing that the Court’s affirmative-
action cases “reflect[] a doctrinal move towards converting efforts to rectify racial inequality 
into white racial injury”); Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic 
of Selective Admissions, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1048–49 (2002) (criticizing the Court for 
“unduly magnifying the practical harm suffered by white applicants” in affirmative-action cases 
and failing to recognize that “the admission of minority applicants and the rejection of white 
applicants are largely independent events”). 
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a preclusive asymmetry to the detriment of the defendant.327 Had the 
plaintiff brought the case as a class action, the stakes could have been 
more evenly aligned; after certification, a win for the defendant would 
have generated class-wide preclusion in its favor.328 
Developments during the Fisher litigation ruled out the 
possibility of a structural injunction, or indeed any forward-looking 
remedies. Before the Fifth Circuit decided her initial appeal, the 
plaintiff disclaimed any intent to reapply to the defendant’s 
undergraduate program.329 Before the Supreme Court issued its 
decision, the plaintiff had graduated from college, ruling out any 
remaining possibility that she would reapply.330 These circumstances 
rendered moot the plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief.331 At the time 
it reached the Supreme Court, the case had been pending for more 
than eight years, but it could result in no injunctive or declaratory 
relief. At most, a court could award damages for any harm the 
plaintiff had individually suffered.332 
On remand, the Fifth Circuit expressed doubt as to the 
availability of even a damages remedy, due to the plaintiff’s apparent 
lack of standing to seek monetary relief.333 The court decided the 
merits of the case in the defendant’s favor, but in doing so, it 
 
 327. Carroll, supra note 28, at 2052–55. 
 328. Id. at 2052. Class treatment would have had benefits for the plaintiff as well. Indeed, 
some have asserted that the plaintiff erred by not bringing the case as a class action. See, e.g., 
Adam D. Chandler, How (Not) To Bring an Affirmative-Action Challenge, 122 YALE L.J. 
ONLINE 85, 87 (2012); Erwin Chemerinsky, What’s Next for Affirmative Action?, ABA J. (Aug. 
6, 2013, 2:25 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky_whats_next_for_
affirmative_action [http:// perma.cc/LDG7-YRQN]. 
 329. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 2011) (concluding that the 
plaintiff could not seek forward-looking relief because she had no intention of reapplying to the 
defendant’s undergraduate program). 
 330. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 
(2013) (No. 11-345), 2012 WL 4812586, at *5 (showing Justice Sotomayor’s comment that the 
plaintiff could not seek injunctive relief because she had graduated).  
 331. See generally City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105–07 (1983) (requiring a 
“real and immediate” threat of future injury to establish standing for injunctive relief). 
 332. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 217. 
 333. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. 
Ct. 2888 (2015). The Supreme Court has again granted certiorari, and UT Austin has devoted 
seven pages of its merits brief to the argument that Fisher lacks standing. See Brief for 
Respondents at 17–24, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 14-981, 2015 WL 6467640; see also 
Richard M. Re, Does Fisher I Establish Jurisdiction for Fisher II?, PRAWFSBLAWG (Nov. 17, 
2015, 8:25 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/11/does-fisher-i-establish-
jurisdiction-for-fisher-ii.html [http://perma.cc/FQ2Z-YWS5] (discussing UT Austin’s standing 
arguments). 
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suggested that it may have issued an unconstitutional advisory 
opinion.334 In terms of judicial economy and legitimacy, this result is 
hardly an optimal one. Had the plaintiff brought a class action, this 
strain on the courts’ resources and authority could have been 
avoided: even after the plaintiff’s individual claim had become moot, 
she would have been able to continue seeking injunctive and 
declaratory relief on behalf of the class.335 
Like the plaintiff in Fisher, plaintiffs in many other recent cases 
have chosen not to pursue class treatment when challenging a 
defendant’s generally applicable policy or practice; notwithstanding 
the absence of class treatment, these cases address matters of 
widespread significance.336 It is not possible to draw a direct 
connection between the plaintiff’s decision in any one of those cases 
and the across-the-board barriers that the current class-action debate 
has produced.337 Yet simple logic suggests that making class treatment 
more difficult will cause fewer plaintiffs to pursue it, especially when 
another option appears to be available. The undifferentiated 
constraints on class actions thus contribute to the harms and 
inefficiencies involved in these types of nonclass cases. 
In sum, courts now refuse to certify class actions that would 
readily have achieved certification in 1966, causing the loss of some of 
the benefits that the authors of the 1966 revisions sought to capture. 
Class treatment of injunctive and declaratory claims under the civil-
rights subtype was designed to promote remedial efficacy and the rule 
 
 334. Fisher, 758 F.3d at 640 (acknowledging that the defendant’s “standing arguments carry 
force,” but interpreting the Supreme Court’s mandate to decide the merits of the case as a bar 
to considering whether the plaintiff lacked standing). 
 335. See U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404 (1980); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 
393, 402–03 (1975). 
 336. See generally Carroll, supra note 28, at 2039–48 (discussing the disincentives to pursuing 
class treatment and their impact on important litigation). For example, consider the recent 
litigation over marriage rights for same-sex couples: the majority of those cases, including the 
cases that ultimately reached the Supreme Court, proceeded on a nonclass basis. See, e.g., 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). The 
absence of class treatment caused significant problems—including confusion over remedial 
scope, and tension between federal and state courts—in several states, including Alabama. See, 
e.g., Howard M. Wasserman, Crazy in Alabama: But Not for the Reasons Everyone Thinks, 
JURIST (Mar. 14, 2015, 11:22 AM), http://jurist.org/forum/2015/03/howard-wasserman-alabama-
marriage.php [http://perma.cc/4ZEN-B3DW] (describing the “uncertain, inefficient and even 
ugly” manner in which same-sex marriage came to Alabama, including procedural moves and 
counter-moves by the Alabama Supreme Court and the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of Alabama). 
 337. See supra Part III. 
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of law—as the Fisher example suggests, its absence can give rise to 
difficult problems of preclusive asymmetry and judicial inefficiency.338 
Similarly, when cases seeking logically indivisible relief proceed in the 
absence of class treatment, they expose courts and defendants to the 
risk of inconsistent judgments. And when cases seeking distribution 
of a limited fund proceed individually, they jeopardize the interests of 
those who obtain their judgments last. Whatever limitations might be 
justified for those subtypes should be imposed intentionally, after 
reasoned analysis of their particular costs and benefits, and not as a 
spillover effect of concerns about a separate class form. 
V.  BEYOND MYOPIA: BROADENING THE DISCUSSION 
A myopic focus on the aggregated-damages subtype has impeded 
courts’ and litigants’ ability to achieve the full potential of the 
structure set forth in the class-action rule, particularly for those 
situations in which the need for class treatment has long been well 
recognized. As this Part explains, a broader discussion would take 
into account all of the purposes served by the class-action rule, and all 
of the subtypes it contains. 
A. Disaggregating the Concerns, Differentiating the Responses 
To achieve the necessary broadening of the discussion, debates 
over the costs and benefits of class actions must consistently address 
two neglected questions. First, does a particular concern about “the 
class action” actually apply in the context of subtypes other than the 
aggregated-damages class action, and if so, how? As suggested by the 
earlier discussions of settlement pressure and the logical-indivisibility 
subtype;339 attorney overcompensation and the injunctive civil-rights 
subtype;340 and delay, expense, and the limited-fund subtype;341 the 
concerns that courts, lawmakers, and scholars have identified in the 
context of the aggregated-damages class action can play out very 
differently in the context of other class forms. Each subtype therefore 
requires separate analysis with regard to the salience of each 
particular concern. 
 
 338. See Carroll, supra note 28, at 2052–68. 
 339. See supra Part II.A. 
 340. See supra Part II.B. 
 341. See supra Part II.C. 
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Second, if a concern does arise in the context of another subtype, 
will denying class treatment effectively address it, and will it do so 
without generating countervailing concerns? The current class-action 
debate generally relies on an underlying assumption that denying 
certification usually does represent an effective response to concerns 
about class treatment. This assumption itself arises from the context 
of the aggregated-damages class action, where denying certification 
can be expected to lead to the abandonment of individually low-value 
claims and the nonclass litigation of individually high-value claims. In 
other contexts, however, the absence of class treatment may permit or 
even exacerbate the threatened harm.342 Tailoring the conduct of class 
proceedings to the problem at issue may therefore present a better 
institutional response.343 
Though the problem of class-action myopia is wide-reaching in 
scope and effect, the solution can be simply stated: courts and 
lawmakers should stop imposing undifferentiated limitations on the 
availability of class treatment unless they conclude that (1) the 
concerns motivating a particular limitation actually apply to each of 
the class-action subtypes and (2) the concerns can be uniformly 
resolved by the denial of class treatment. If this solution were 
adopted, it would result in more effective and conceptually coherent 
standards for the conduct of class actions. 
B. Converting to Subtype-Differentiated Standards 
Achieving the necessary recalibration of class-action law will not 
only require changing the approach that courts and lawmakers take 
going forward, when evaluating new restrictions on class actions, it 
will also require reevaluating the restrictions that courts and 
lawmakers have already imposed. That reevaluation should include a 
consideration of which of the recent across-the-board changes, if any, 
 
 342. See Rhode, supra note 289, at 1196. 
 343. See Carroll, supra note 28, at 2074–83. For example, a proposed injunctive civil-rights 
class action may present concerns about agency costs because of ideological disagreements 
among members of the class. Id. at 2080–81. Denying certification on the basis of those 
concerns, however, could leave the plaintiff free to seek a system-wide remedy in the nonclass 
case, regardless of whether that remedy were the one that other class members would prefer. 
See supra note 289. Accordingly, a court hearing such a case might better respond to concerns 
about agency costs by inviting broader intervention or amicus participation in the remedial 
phase of the proceedings. This would be especially true if the court viewed the case as likely to 
result in a wide-reaching precedent or a system-wide remedy. See Carroll, supra note 28, at 
2081–82. 
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should be converted via rulemaking into subtype-differentiated 
standards.344 
In particular, the rulemaking committees should consider 
revising Rule 23 to create subtype-differentiated standards for 
interlocutory appeals, evidentiary burdens, and ascertainability. With 
regard to interlocutory appeals, the rationale for Rule 23(f)345 relied 
almost entirely on concerns about settlement pressure and the “death 
knell” thesis. As explained earlier, those concerns are strongly rooted 
in the aggregated-damages class action, and have little to no salience 
outside that context.346 An additional motivation for the provision was 
to facilitate the development of appellate law on class certification, 
which is a valid purpose regardless of subtype. But interlocutory 
review appears to be less important to achieving that purpose in the 
context of the traditional subtypes than in the context of the 
aggregated-damages class action. This difference exists because, in 
the absence of in terrorem settlement concerns, the class certification 
decision can be effectively reviewed as part of an appeal from the 
final judgment—or, at least, it can be reviewed as effectively as any 
other pretrial ruling subject to the final judgment rule.347 Moreover, as 
noted previously, interlocutory review can increase the time and 
effort required for litigation under the traditional subtypes,348 creating 
a detriment that weighs against the potential benefit of the 
development of appellate law. Accordingly, Rule 23(f) should be 
revised to permit interlocutory appeals from certification decisions 
only under the aggregated-damages subtype.349 
With regard to evidentiary burdens, concerns about settlement 
pressure have provided the bulk of the motivation for recent judicial 
 
 344. By “subtype-differentiated standards” I mean class-action procedures or requirements 
that apply differently depending on the subtype at issue. For example, in its current form, the 
class-action rule requires a court to order notice to class members when granting certification 
under the aggregated-damages subtype, but gives the court discretion whether to order such 
notice when granting certification under the other subtypes. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A)–(B). 
The rule thus imposes subtype-differentiated standards for class notice. 
 345. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (“A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting 
or denying class-action certification under this rule if a petition for permission to appeal is filed 
with the circuit clerk within 14 days after the order is entered.”). 
 346. See supra Part II.A. 
 347. Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Public Schools, discussed supra Part IV.A, is an example of a 
case in which such review occurred. 
 348. See supra Part IV.B. 
 349. I have argued elsewhere that Rule 23(f) should not apply in cases involving purely 
injunctive or declaratory relief under the civil-rights subtype. See Carroll, supra note 28, at 
2075–76. 
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decisions raising the standard of proof required for class 
certification.350 As Robert Bone has noted, these decisions are “thin 
on careful analysis” and have “fail[ed] to seriously engage the 
competing policies at stake,” particularly as those policies vary with 
the type of class action involved.351 A robust rulemaking process 
should fill that gap, creating a set of evidentiary standards that reflect 
the different costs and benefits associated with each subtype. 
Although the particular evidentiary standards to be adopted are 
beyond the scope of this Article, the situating of concerns within the 
aggregated-damages subtype suggests that a higher evidentiary 
standard would be appropriate under that subtype as compared to the 
others. 
Indeed, it may make sense to revise the injunctive civil-rights 
subtype so that it permits certification based on no greater showing 
than that required to establish the plaintiffs’ standing.352 This 
certification burden would not relieve plaintiffs of the obligation to 
prove the merits of their claims or the appropriateness of their 
proposed remedy at later stages in the litigation, but it would help to 
avoid scenarios in which courts never reach the merits of widely held 
claims at all.353 Further, such a standard would reduce the delays 
involved in obtaining class certification,354 and would thereby help to 
avoid scenarios in which plaintiffs proceed through the personally less 
burdensome, but institutionally less desirable, nonclass path toward a 
structural injunction.355 Finally, it would promote preclusive 
symmetry, as a postcertification merits decision would bind class 
members to a determination that the defendant did not in fact engage 
in the alleged policy or practice.356 Current law does not generally 
provide for that binding effect, because class members can be bound 
 
 350. Bone, supra note 182, at 1110. 
 351. Bone, supra note 134, at 112–14. 
 352. David Marcus introduced this argument in the context of public-interest class actions 
brought pursuant to the injunctive civil-rights subtype. See Marcus, Public Interest, supra note 38 
(manuscript at 58) (“The evidentiary burden at class certification for public interest plaintiffs 
[under Rule 23(b)(2)] should equal the evidentiary burden a plaintiff would bear to establish 
standing . . . .”). 
 353. See supra Part IV.A. 
 354. See supra Part IV.B. 
 355. See supra Parts IV.C. 
 356. See supra notes 322–27 and accompanying text. 
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only through class certification,357 and a finding that the defendant did 
not engage in the alleged policy or practice can defeat certification.358 
With regard to ascertainability, the problem is less that courts 
have created an undifferentiated standard and more that, due to their 
myopic focus on aggregated-damages class actions, they have lost 
sight of the differentiation that the rule was intended to include from 
the start.359 As noted earlier, the Advisory Committee note to the 
1966 revisions recognized that the members of a class certified under 
the injunctive civil-rights subtype would “usually” be “incapable of 
specific enumeration.”360 Nothing in the text of the rule, however, 
explicitly codifies the subtype-differentiated understanding of 
ascertainability set forth in the note.361 Accordingly, the rulemaking 
committees should modify the text so that it imposes a looser 
ascertainability requirement for injunctive civil-rights and logical-
indivisibility class actions than for aggregated-damages and limited-
fund class actions. 
C. Highlighting History 
Courts will be more likely to embrace an appropriately subtype-
differentiated analysis if lawmakers, scholars, and litigants draw their 
attention to the historical origins of the traditional subtypes,362 and to 
the longstanding history of creating and acknowledging doctrinal 
differences between those subtypes and the aggregated-damages class 
action.363 
 
 357. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2380 (2011). But see Tobias Barrington Wolff, 
Multiple Attempts at Class Certification, 99 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 137, 141 (2014) (arguing against 
“the suggestion in Bayer that the current version of Rule 23 would foreclose a district court 
from ever employing procedures designed to give a denial of certification binding effect”). 
 358. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552–54 (2011). 
 359. See supra Part III.C. 
 360. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment. 
 361. Indeed, nothing in the text of the rule explicitly codifies any requirement of 
ascertainability. The text onto which the ascertainability requirement has been engrafted states 
only that “[a]n order that certifies a class action must define the class and the class claims, 
issues, or defenses, and must appoint class counsel under Rule 23(g).” FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(c)(1)(B). 
 362. Recent scholarship has greatly enhanced the tools available for understanding and 
illuminating these historical origins. See, e.g., Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions for Monetary 
Relief Under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B): Does Due Process Require Notice and Opt-Out 
Rights?, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 798, 810–22 (2014); Marcus, Flawed but Noble, supra note 24, 
at 671–711; Marcus, History, supra note 48, at 600–22. 
 363. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A)–(B) (creating different notice and opt-out 
requirements for aggregated-damages class actions versus the other class forms); Phillips 
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The U.S. Supreme Court, in particular, has emphasized the 
importance of history to the interpretation and application of the 
class-action rule.364 Yet dicta in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes suggest 
that the Court has lost sight of a crucial aspect of that history, 
involving the origins and purposes of the injunctive civil-rights class 
action. The Court acknowledged, as it had before,365 that “‘[c]ivil 
rights cases against parties charged with unlawful, class-based 
discrimination are prime examples’ of what (b)(2) is meant to 
capture.”366 Yet it went on to assert that the “justification[] for class 
treatment” pursuant to the injunctive civil-rights subtype is “that the 
relief sought must perforce affect the entire class at once”367—in other 
words, that the relief in such cases is “indivisible.”368 
If taken literally, the Wal-Mart Court’s assertion about the 
purpose of the injunctive civil-rights class action cannot be squared 
with the history of that provision,369 which was motivated in part by 
the problem that the relief in desegregation cases was not logically 
indivisible, permitting district courts to enter “meaningless, 
individual-by-individual injunctions” instead of structural relief.370 As 
Benjamin Kaplan wrote during the drafting process, 
If a school desegregation case, for example, is maintained by an 
individual on his own behalf, rather than as a class action, very likely 
the relief will be confined to admission of the individual to the 
 
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 n.3 (1985) (acknowledging implicitly that the 
procedural-due-process analysis differs for aggregated-damages class actions versus the other 
class forms).  
 364. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557–58 (2011); Ortiz v. 
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 833–45 (1999); Wolff, supra note 251, at 1040 (noting that the 
Wal-Mart Court “discusse[d] the history and origins of Rule 23 as a lens through which to 
scrutinize the proper function of subsection (b)(2)”). 
 365. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997). 
 366. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557–58 (alteration in original) (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 
614). 
 367. Id. at 2558. 
 368. See id. at 2557 (“The key to the (b)(2) class is ‘the indivisible nature of the injunctive or 
declaratory remedy warranted—the notion that the conduct is such that it can be enjoined or 
declared unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none of them.’” (quoting 
Nagareda, supra note 247, at 132)). 
 369. Elsewhere in the opinion, the Court articulated the purpose of the injunctive civil-rights 
subtype in a more historically consistent way. For example, it accords with historical practice to 
state (as the Court did in Wal-Mart) that “Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or 
declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member of the class.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 
2557. 
 370. Marcus, Flawed but Noble, supra note 24, at 710. 
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school and will not encompass broad corrective measures—
desegregation of the school. This would be unfortunate. . . .371 
The history of desegregation litigation, and its role in the drafting of 
the injunctive civil-rights class action, thus refutes the Court’s 
assertion that the relief in such cases “must perforce affect the entire 
class at once.”372 
As this example suggests, the proper interpretation of the class-
action rule—including the appropriate analysis of subtype-
differentiated standards embodied within the rule—may require 
greater efforts to bring the Court back to the historical origins of the 
traditional subtypes, especially with regard to the injunctive civil-
rights class action. 
CONCLUSION 
In interpreting and modifying procedural law, courts and 
lawmakers must move beyond the erroneous assumption that all class 
forms entail the same challenges and concerns as the aggregated-
damages class action, which is the newest and most controversial of 
the subtypes captured in the modern class-action rule. If those 
decisionmakers continue with their current level of class-action 
myopia, many of the intended benefits of the device’s other forms will 
ultimately be lost. Regardless of what restrictions the aggregated-
damages class action may warrant, those restrictions should not be 
permitted to destroy the utility of the other mechanisms that the 
class-action rule creates. 
 
 371. Id. at 700 (alteration in original). Kaplan added that “if the action is not maintained as 
a class action, the contempt remedy would presumably not be available to anyone but the 
individual plaintiff, and others in similar position could be put to separate proceedings with 
ensuing delay.” Id. at 700–01. 
 372. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2558. One way of squaring this circle is to read the Court as 
referring not to logical indivisibility, but to what might be termed precedential indivisibility—the 
notion that the liability question cannot be decided differently for different members of the 
class, making the resulting precedent legally and factually indistinguishable in cases brought by 
similarly situated claimants. Richard Nagareda, on whose scholarship the Wal-Mart Court 
relied, appears to have originally intended this meaning of indivisibility. See Richard A. 
Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
149, 180 (2003) (“Absent demands for damages, the liability issue—whether the defendant’s 
generally applicable conduct deviates from the governing legal standard—is indivisible in the 
sense that the defendant’s conduct is either lawful or unlawful as to everyone it affects.”). 
